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ABSTRACT
Contrary to the predictions of conventional economic theory,
firms often benefit by increasing consumer transaction costs.
Firms do so by, for example, obscuring contract terms in a
variety of ways, such as providing them after the contract is
agreed to, enclosing them with other more interesting
information, using small print, and omitting important terms
such as arbitration fees from the written contract. Firms also
benefit by taking advantage of predictable consumer behaviors,
such as the tendency of consumers not to seek rebates, to
overload when provided with too much information, and to
ignore dull information when overshadowed by vivid
information. Using behavioral law and economics, this Article
provides examples ofpractices that inflate consumer transaction
costs, explains why firms benefit from such practices, and
describes the conditions giving rise to such practices. This
Article also explains why inflated consumer transaction costs
are objectionable and explores the law's response to the problem.
Finally, the Article argues that lawmakers should adopt a norm
barring the unnecessary inflation of consumer transaction costs
and describes tests that lawmakers can employ to implement
such a norm.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article contends that another norm should be added to the
pantheon of consumer protection: merchants should not increase
consumer transaction costs without good cause. While many
existing consumer protection rules can be explained by this norm,
the law's failure to adopt such a policy explicitly has damaged
consumers. This principle should be embraced and used to formu-
late consumer protection rules. After supporting these claims, this
Article offers guidance for implementing such a norm.
At first glance, such a norm may seem unnecessary. In many
contexts, contracting parties have no incentive to increase transac-
tion costs unnecessarily.' They obviously do not gain by inflating
their own transaction costs for no purpose. They often will not
benefit by unnecessarily increasing the transaction costs of those
entering into contracts with them either. Conventional economic
wisdom suggests that if people unnecessarily increase the costs
incurred by their contracting parties, those parties are likely to find
it cheaper to do business with a competitor.' The practice may also
generate ill will.
Consumer transactions, however, do not always follow this
general rule, if indeed it is a general rule. In many circumstances,
businesses benefit by increasing consumer transaction costs to
the detriment of consumers. Indeed, some practices are profit-
able largely because they inflate consumer transaction costs.
Accordingly, firms increase consumer transaction costs because
doing so enriches them. Although these practices reduce the surplus
from exchange, firms find that acceptable because they maximize
their individual gains from the transaction.'
1. See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 34 (1968)
("[Elxchange will tend to be conducted in ways that economize on the cost of transacting.").
2. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
3. The phrase "surplus from exchange" refers to the value created by the contract. See
Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1432, 1462 (1985). Firms may increase their own gains from a transaction, but if they reduce
the consumer's gain from the transaction by more than the firm gains, the total gains from
the transaction are reduced.
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An example that will be used throughout this Article is mail-in
rebates. Mail-in rebates increase the costs consumers must incur to
obtain the reduced price; instead of simply paying less for the item
from the beginning, as would be true with a sale item, consumers
must fill out a form, gather proofs of purchase, and send them to the
manufacturer.4 The result is that only a handful of consumers
obtain rebates; estimates range from a low of less than three
percent,5 to five to ten percent,6 to forty to fifty percent.7 Some
4. See Peter K Tat, Rebate Usage: A Motivational Perspective, 11 PSYCHOL. &
MARKETING 15, 17 (1994).
The rebate redemption process is complicated and time consuming. The
redeemer has to collect the rebate certificate, complete the form, mail the form
to the fulfillment center with the qualifiers, i.e., the proofs of purchase and sales
receipts, before the expiration date. Having performed these tasks, the redeemer
has to wait for four to six weeks to receive the rebate check. In some instances,
the terms of the rebate are so inconvenient and difficult that the whole process
becomes a very frustrating experience for the redeemers.
Id.
5. See David Jacobson, What Good Are Rebates? Everybody Likes Them, But Nobody
Mails Them In, BUFF. NEWS (N.Y.), June 23, 1993, at 1 ("On average, only 2.5 percent of the
rebates available at the store are ever sent in. A mere 0.5 percent of the rebates made
available via print advertising get mailed off.... [Olly 2.4 percent of clip-out coupons and 27.4
percent of on-package coupons get used...."); Christine Winter, Tardy Rebates Anger Buyers;
Complaints Lead to State Inquiry and At Least One Class-Action Lawsuit, SUN-SENTINEL
(Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Apr. 16, 2000, at 1A (quoting Holly Anderson, spokeswoman for the
National Consumers League, as saying, "We believe that only 2 to 3 percent of all those who
buy successfully fill out those rebates and get their money back.").
6. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1450 (1999); William M. Bulkeley,
Rebates' Secret Appeal to Manufacturers: Few Consumers Actually Redeem Them, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 10, 1998, at B1 (quoting Wes Bray, a partner in Market Growth Resources Inc., a
consulting firm, as saying, "Not many consumers redeem [rebate coupons]-5% to 10%
maximum"); Ryan Malkin, Cash In on Rebates, SMARTMONEY, Sept. 2003, at 63 (reporting
that "90 percent of consumers don't send in the rebate-or do it incorrectly"); Stuart
Silverstein, As Rebates Spread, Some Consumers Fume, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1998, at C1 ("In
the supermarket and drugstore industries ... redemption rates-the percentage of customers
who receive rebates-average below 10%.").
7. See Howard Millman, Customers Tire of Excuses for Rebates That Never Arrive, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at G9 (reporting that approximately sixty percent of purchasers never
get the rebates on the goods they bought); see also Renee DeGross, The Spate of Rebates; More
Sellers of Products Use Them To Entice Customers--Some of Whom End Up Unhappy,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 18, 2003, at 1C ("Various surveys conclude that a little less than half
of consumers who buy goods with rebate offers actually try to redeem them. About 20 percent
wind up in disputes, according to the Aberdeen Group, a Boston-based market research
firm."); Forget Coupons and Rebates-Just Lower the Prices, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans,
La.), Apr. 30, 1993, at E5 ("Companies offering rebates know that most consumers don't mail
in their forms."); Lorrie Grant, Rebates Motivate Consumer Choices, USATODAY, Mar. 1, 2004,
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purchasers never send the rebate form in, while others mail the
form to the manufacturer but are denied the rebate because they did
not comply with the stated requirements, by, for example, omitting
the product's serial number.'
When consumers fail to obtain rebates, manufacturers retain the
funds involved, making rebates particularly valuable to manufactur-
ers, especially when compared to coupons or sales. Manufacturers
apparently employ rebates chiefly because they increase sales by
creating an illusion of a lower price, while the transaction costs
generated by rebate offers permit manufacturers effectively to
charge the unrebated price to most consumers. 9
at 6B ("'Two people out of five never bother to apply for the rebate,' says analyst Peter
Kastner of information technology market analysis firm Aberdeen Group."); Louis J. Haugh,
Refunds: An Old Standby Stands Out, ADVERTISING AGE, May 3, 1982, at M-26 (referring to
a Nielsen study that said that forty-seven percent of consumers do not follow through on
redemption offers); Silverstein, supra note 6 (reporting that in computer and consumer
electronics industries "redemption rates commonly run from 15% to as high as 80%.").
8. See Edward J. Finn, The Great Rebate Caper, 131 SALES & MARKETING MGMT., Oct.
10, 1983, at 43 (noting that one consumer was denied a rebate because the consumer failed
to submit an original, dated sales receipt with the store name clearly shown); Millman, supra
note 7.
9. Daniel Seligman, The Rebate Debate, FoRTUNE, Dec. 12, 1994, at 255 ("[C]ompanies
want people to be initially attracted by the lower price but repelled by the bother of
collecting-so that many of them end up not asking for the rebate."); Silverstein, supra note
6 ("Why not just make life simple for consumers and provide the discounts at the cash
register? Because for most retailers and manufacturers, that would defeat the purpose of
rebating."); Winter, supra note 5 (quoting Michael Erbschloe, vice president of research for
Computer Economics, a marketing research firm, as saying, "Why not just do the rebates at
the store? Because everybody would collect then, that's why. If they were sincere about
cutting the price, they would all rebate at the cash register."); see also Bulkeley, supra note
6 (quoting Charles Weil, president of Young America Inc., which mails rebate checks, as
saying, "the whole point behind rebates is to entice purchases and hope [consumers] don't
remember to submit" claims (alteration in original)); DeGross, supra note 7 ('Manufacturers
hope some consumers will forget about claiming the rebate check, to the benefit of the maker,'
said Kurt Barnard, president of Retail Forecasting, which tracks shopping trends and
consumer spending."); Grant, supra note 7 ("'Consumers treat rebates as a discount at the
time of purchase, but their post-purchase behavior is that they don't redeem them,' says
Dhruv Grewal, professor of marketing at Babson College ...."); Jacobson, supra note 5 ("[Elven
though people don't send in for rebates, they like the idea of them.... [According to Kerry
Smith Sr., publisher and editor of Promo Magazine, manufacturers use rebates because
consumers do not] take [sellers] up on the incentive [and thus consumers pay] full retail for
[products]. But [consumers] respond[] to a price-reduction offer."); Millman, supra note 7
('Manufacturers have the better of two worlds when they use rebates,' said Z. John Zhang,
an associate professor of marketing at the University of Pennsylvania. 'Rebates motivate
consumers to buy at full price, and many consumers never send in their rebates for
redemption.'); Silverstein, supra note 6 ("Mhe rebate phenomenon relies on simple consumer
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Commentators claim that some manufacturers, in an effort to
make rebates even more profitable, impose time-consuming
requirements as a part of rebate applications largely to discourage
consumers from submitting them.' ° For example, one manufacturer
required consumers to mail in the end panel from a box, a dated
cash register receipt, and a form on which the consumer had to
write five words of four or more letters that can be formed by using
the letters from the phrase "full prescription strength."" Similarly,
when one seller offered a computer system for $300 after rebates,
consumers had to submit four different rebate forms to four
different firms, each with a different set of rules. 2 As the head of
one company offering rebates explained, "We're not trying to make
it easy."" Companies that administer rebate programs are reported
to "frequently tout their ability to run rebate promotions with a
large face value but a low redemption rate."4
psychology. Manufacturers and retailers know that if an advertisement touts a powerful
computer as costing less than $1,000-after rebate-it draws customers to the store. They
also know that many of those same consumers will forget to mail in their rebate forms or give
up when the requirements prove to be too much of a burden."); cf id. ("[A] number of
manufacturers, though hardly the majority, apparently want to enjoy the advantages of
rebates without paying for them promptly, if at all." (emphasis added)).
10. See Peter Tat, William Cunningham & Emin Babakus, Consumer Perception of
Rebates, J. ADVERTISING RES. Aug.-Sept. 1988, at 45, 46 ("[Clertain rebate offers seem to be
designed to discourage consumer participation."); Tat, supra note 4, at 17 ("The rebate
redemption process is complicated and time consuming."); Carole Fleck, The Long Rebate
Wait: Clip the Bar Code, Circle the Receipt, Cross Your Fingers, AARP BULL., Apr. 2004, at 21,
available at http/www.aarp.org/buUetin/yourmoney/Articles/a2004-04-22-long-rebate.html
("[Slome [companies] deliberately make it difficult to redeem rebates by imposing complex
qualifying terms and conditions."); Grant, supra note 7 ("The system is generally set up to
make applying for the money as difficult as possible."); Millman, supra note 7. But see
Silverstein, supra note 6 ("Industry officials contend that few, if any, manufacturers impose
requirements simply to dissuade consumers from seeking rebates. All the same, they concede
that many manufacturers don't want to make the process so easy that everyone gets
rebates."); The Rebate That Isn't, CONSUMER REP., Jan. 1986, at 67 ("One inspired variation
is to make the terms of the rebate so inconvenient that only masochists would bother.").
11. See Jacobson, supra note 5.
12. See Doin' the Rebate Rumba: Are the Deals Worth the Dance?, CONSUMER REP., Nov.
1999, at 62 [hereinafter Rebate Rumba].
13. Toni Mack, Rebate Madness, FORBES, Feb. 13, 1984, at 76. The article explains that
the use of rebates "can stimulate sales at no extra cost," and quotes another officer of the
same company as saying that "[pleople promise, Tm gonna take that rebate form and send
in for my $5.' But most of them don't." Id. at 79.
14. Millman, supra note 7 (quoting Z. John Zhang, associate professor of marketing at the
University of Pennsylvania).
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Some sellers have gone even further. One manufacturer required
consumers to send in the price code from the product's carton, even
though the carton did not have a price code.15 Another manufacturer
instructed consumers to hold a bottle under boiling water for five
minutes to remove the neck label so it could be submitted to the
manufacturer. 6 Still another seller limited the rebate in fine print
to those who had purchased the item on one of two days in July and
required applications to be postmarked by the end of July. 7
Consumer Reports warns readers, "[h]iding important details is all
part of the rebate game."18
Given the profitability of rebates, their swelling popularity is
hardly surprising. 9 Estimates of the total number of rebates offered
in 2003 (excluding car sales) are as high as six billion dollars20 with
one chain alone reportedly having offered rebates on 217 different
15. The Rebate That Isn't, supra note 10. The article also describes other ways
manufacturers made obtaining rebates difficult:
[A manufacturer] offered a ... rebate with the purchase of 12 quarts of motor oil.
To collect, you had to send in a dated sales receipt for the 12 cans plus the
emblems from 7 cans-and you had to do it within 30 days of purchase.
Stripping the emblem from the cardboard can require care: Cut too deep and the
oil would leak out.... [Another manufacturer] had a sticker that promised a $1
refund, with "details on the back of the sticker." You had to open the box before
you could read the back of the sticker, which explained that you had to buy two
boxes.
Id.
16. Finn, supra note 8; see also Jacobson, supra note 5 (describing a rebate offer in which
a liqueur bottle had to be soaked in warm water so that the label could be removed and mailed
in). The rebate process for a computer printer was similarly difficult:
The form says that to get the check, you attach the sales receipt, which "must
include the ... serial number and purchase date." Alas, our sales receipt from
Dell did not include the serial number.... [W]e placed seriatim calls to Dell and
Hewlett-Packard customer service people and were told at both ends that the
existing sales receipt would doubtless be okay so long as we knew the serial
number (which has to be written in on the form itself). The chap at Hewlett-
Packard said that what really mattered was making sure the serial number was
shown on the bar code label, which is glued to the cardboard box the printer
comes in. You are expected to remove this label surgically with something like
a razor blade and send it in along with the sales receipt and rebate form.
Seligman, supra note 9.
17. See Rebate Rumba, supra note 12.
18. Id.
19. See Malkin, supra note 6 ("Manufacturer rebate offerings have increased 167 percent
from 2000.").
20. DeGross, supra note 7 (claiming that $6 billion in 2003 represents an increase from
$3.3 billion in 1999).
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products.2 In some sectors of the economy, rebates are ubiquitous.22
But the practice of offering rebates that manufacturers know will
not be redeemed because of transaction costs is arguably fraudulent.
Rebates also share a quality with the widely banned practice of bait
and switch23 : consumers are baited by the rebate and effectively
switched to a different transaction. Though in some cases that is
because of the consumer's own behavior, manufacturers understand
that many consumers act in such a fashion; indeed, manufacturers
depend on it. Manufacturers do have an alternative that eliminates
consumer transaction costs: they could replace the rebate with a
lower price. In short, manufacturers find rebates attractive precisely
because they generate consumer transaction costs.
One way to address rebates is to see them as a particular species
of fraud and deal with them through existing common law deceit
claims and deceptive trade practices legislation.24 Certainly some
rebate practices violate these rules, and perhaps all do. Another way
to respond to the rebate problem is to adopt legislation outlawing or
regulating rebates." This might force manufacturers to offer their
products at a lower price to all consumers or perhaps to sell at the
actual price without misleading consumers into erroneously
thinking they will obtain a rebate. In either case, many consumers
would benefit.26 By and large, consumer protection law has re-
sponded to individual examples of firms increasing consumer
21. Bulkeley, supra note 6.
22. See Millman, supra note 7.
In 2002, 75 percent of the ads placed by retailers and software makers for
products like word processing and spreadsheet programs contained offers of
rebates, according to Roger Lanctot, an analyst with the Beyen Corporation, a
market research firm based in Niagara Falls, N.Y. For highly competitive
hardware components like hand-held organizers, ads offering rebates tripled last
year.
Id.
23. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.356(6)(4) (West 2002); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW.
§ 396 (Consol. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-217(a) (2004).
24. See generally Dee Pridgen, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW 13-544 (2003)
(discussing common law misrepresentation, state unfair and deceptive practices acts, and
private action to enforce these laws).
25. See, e.g., S.B. 1154, 2003-2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004) (vetoed Sept. 29, 2004) (law would
have regulated rebates).
26. Not all consumers would benefit, however. Consumers who obtain the rebate would
lose their savings, though they would recapture the time devoted to securing the rebate. See
DeGross, supra note 7 ("Experts say rebates can work for careful consumers ....").
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transaction costs in just such an ad hoc fashion: by barring the
objectionable practices or attempting to subsume them under
existing norms. Although helpful, such an approach leaves intact
the ability of merchants to increase consumer transaction costs in
other ways. This Article contends that in addition to adopting or
adapting rules to respond to specific acts, consumer protection law
should embrace a general norm that unnecessarily increasing
consumer transaction costs is itself objectionable and the idea that
such a norm should serve as a basis for both legislation and case
law. 2
7
While some practices that inflate transaction costs are also
deceptive, such as rebates, many are not. The current debate
regarding the relative merits of the opt-in and opt-out approaches
to personal privacy provides an illustration.28 Many companies
profit not only from selling goods to consumers but also from selling
27. In some circumstances, consumers may also benefit from the imposition of transaction
costs on other parties. The debate on penalty defaults sparked by the writing of Ian Ayres and
Robert Gertner provides an example. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). Suppose
a default rule is favorable to a seller. If the seller knows the default rule, the seller has no
incentive to disclose the rule to the consumer, because then the consumer might seek to
contract around the rule, to the detriment of the seller. Ayres and Gertner suggest as a
solution the creation of penalty defaults-default rules that put the burden of contracting
around the default rule on the party who is more likely to be informed about the consequences
of not specifying the rule: "By setting the default rule in favor of the uninformed party, the
courts induce the informed party to reveal information, and, consequently, the efficient
contract results." Id. at 99; see also id. at 103-04 ("When relatively informed parties
strategically withhold information, courts, to promote information revelation, should choose
a default that the informed party does not want."). In other words, the Ayres-Gertner solution
imposes on the seller the transaction costs incurred in contracting around the default rule.
Professor Robert Scott calls default rules adopted for such reasons "information-forcing"
defaults. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19
J. LEGAL STuD. 597, 609-11 (1990); see also Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and
the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 389, 390-91 (1993). Though seemingly
paradoxical, both parties, in theory, will sometimes benefit from higher transaction costs. This
is in line with Robert Cooter's insight that lowering transaction costs delays settlements and
makes noncooperation more likely, both of which may harm the parties. See Robert Cooter,
The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1982).
28. Compare Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for
Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1118 (1999) (arguing for an opt-in
system), with Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development
of U.S. Consumer Protection Policy 41-50 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 04-19, 2004), available at http'//ssrn.com/abstract_id=545182 (former FTC
Chairman Muris arguing against an opt-in system).
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to other businesses the names and addresses of consumers who have
purchased particular goods. Consequently, firms may be reluctant
to trim the names of consumers from their lists; in general, the
fewer names, the less valuable the list. The law, however, requires
some businesses to notify consumers of their right to opt out of the
trade in their personal information. Businesses in this situation
often maximize the costs consumers incur in opting out. For
example, at least one company requires those who opt out to write
the company, even though the company permits consumers to
express their wishes by telephone on matters on which the company
wishes to hear from them. Nor does the company provide a form
that the consumer could fill out and return to the company.29 In
short, many practices that inflate consumer transaction costs cannot
be addressed by existing prohibitions against fraud and so another
basis must be found for attacking them. A ban on unnecessary
increases in consumer transaction costs offers a tool for addressing
problematic practices.
Part I of this Article offers other examples of situations in which
merchants benefit by inflating consumer transaction costs. Part II
describes the conditions giving rise to these situations. Part III
explains why inflating consumer transaction costs is objectionable.
Part IV explores how consumer protection law has responded to
some specific instances of merchants increasing consumer transac-
tion costs. Part V provides guidelines for the operation of a general
norm that merchants may not unnecessarily increase consumer
transaction costs.
I. EXAMPLES OF INFLATED CONSUMER TRANSACTION COSTS
A. Definition
The phrase "transaction costs" has been variously defined, often
depending on the context. 30 For purposes of this Article, "transaction
29. See Sovern, supra note 28, at 1085-87.
30. For example, transaction costs have a particular meaning in the context of Coase's
theorem, though that has not prevented economists from debating that meaning. For lists of
some approaches to transaction costs in that context, see Cooter, supra note 27, at 16; Pierre
Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1675 (1989); Cento G.
Veljanovski, The Coase Theorems and the Economic Theory of Markets and Law, 35 KYKLOS
1644 (Vol. 47:1635
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costs" is defined very broadly to include funds a buyer spends on a
purchase but does not provide directly to the seller and the time a
buyer devotes to making a purchase that does not directly benefit
the seller. For example, the definition includes the costs and time
devoted to making the purchase decision and the time needed to
read small print. Also included are certain costs incurred after the
purchase, such as the time spent filling out a rebate form, efforts to
communicate wishes to firms, and litigation to resolve disputes
arising out of the purchase.3
1. Transaction Costs as Roadblocks
Merchants increase consumer transaction costs in several
circumstances. One is the situation exemplified by rebates, in which
the consumer's performance is complete once the consumer has paid
for the item; all that remains is for the merchant to perform in some
way. If the merchant can throw roadblocks in the way of the
consumer seeking performance, the merchant can avoid performing
and so obtain a windfall. 2 A variant of this situation is the case in
which sellers make it difficult for consumers to communicate
53, 68 (1982). See also Douglas W. Allen, What Are Transaction Costs?, 14 RES. L. & ECON. 1
(1991) (discussing definitions); Steven N.S. Cheung, The Transaction Costs Paradigm: 1998
Presidential Address Western Economic Association, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 514, 515 (1998)
(" Transaction costs' must be defined to be all the costs which do not exist in a Robinson
Crusoe economy."); Richard 0. Zerbe Jr. & Howard E. McCurdy, The Failure of Market
Failure, 18 J. POL'YANALYSIS & MGMT. 558,562 (1999) (stating that transaction costs are "the
resources necessary to transfer, establish, and maintain property rights"); David Driesen &
Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost
Minimization in a World of Friction 31 (Mar. 17, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available
at http//ssrn.com/abstract=386060) (defining transaction costs as "the costs of dealing with
people').
31. Cf. James D. Hess, A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Economic
Organization, 146 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 72, 74 (1990) (including legal costs
of disputes in the definition of transaction costs); Alan Randall, Market Solutions to
Externality Problems: Theory and Practice, 54 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 175, 176 n.2 (1972)
(including the cost of enforcing decisions in the definition of transaction costs).
32. The practice is like an externality for the buyer in that the practice imposes on a party
a nonmonetary effect not taken into account by that party in the contracting process. Cf. Zerbe
& McCurdy, supra note 30, at 561 (offering examples of and providing the classic definition
of externality).
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requests the firm does not wish to receive.33 The privacy opt out
described above is an example. 3'
Some examples of inflated consumer transaction costs are
fairly prosaic and not worthy of lawmakers' attention. For
example, grocery stores place staples such as milk, bread, and
eggs at opposite ends of the store to force consumers to walk past
more items in the store, and thereby increase the chance that the
consumer will make additional purchases.35 By increasing the cost
to consumers of shopping, the store increases its sales.36
2. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.," which addressed whether a
dispute between a consumer and a seller of computers through mail
or telephone orders had to be resolved through arbitration, 8
illustrates at least six ways firms can use increased consumer
transaction costs to enhance their own position. First, rather than
providing consumers with a copy of its standard term contract
before the goods arrived, perhaps by appending the terms to its
purchase order,39 Gateway tucked the contract in with the
33. For an example, a series of articles and letters in The New York Times about how
companies respond to overbilling discussed whether companies deliberately overbill with the
expectation that many consumers will not complain, thus permitting the company to keep the
amount of the overcharge. Consumers wrote in to the Times about the difficulties they
encountered in getting their complaints remedied. In some cases, the overcharges recurred
monthly, but the company insisted that consumers call each month to request an adjustment.
This is surely an example of the company inflating consumer transaction costs for the
company's benefit. More than 1200 consumers wrote to the Times in the first four days about
the problem, suggesting that it may be widespread. See A New Charge Called 'Oops': Readers
Recount Misadventures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at G8; Getting Bilked? Some Think So,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at G9; David Pogue, Checking Your Bill for a New Charge Called
'Oops,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at G1; David Pogue, In Running Down Rogue Charges,
Persistence Is Crucial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at G9.
34. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
35. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 6, at 1447.
36. Cf id. ("[Miost produce aisles are designed as mazes to encourage meandering among
the many fruits and vegetables on display ..... ).
37. 246 A.D.2d 246, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1998).
38. Id. at 248, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
39. Gateway sends customers a written purchase confirmation before shipping the
computer. Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway Widens Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding
Arbitration on Consumers, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1997, at 8, 9.
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computer. ' ° The contract provided that consumers who retained the
computer for more than thirty days after delivery had agreed to
Gateway's terms.41 The company's delayed disclosure of the contract
made it more difficult than necessary for consumers to discover
Gateway's terms. That delay increased the cost to consumers of
comparison shopping for terms, which, in turn, made it easier for
Gateway to avoid competing by offering more favorable terms.42
40. Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 248,676 N.Y.S.2d at 570. Neither Gateway's advertisement nor
its website mentioned an arbitration term, the term at issue in the case. Sternlight, supra
note 39, at 8.
41. Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 248, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 570. This practice of providing consumers
with contract terms after the product is sold and delivered is not unique to Gateway.
The marketing practice of holding back terms in Internet transactions is most
in evidence in the software industry, where disclosure is often delayed until after
credit card payment. In a survey of the 100 largest U.S. personal computer
software companies, the author and her research assistant found that 87.5% of
those that engaged in Web transactions ... did not make pre-transaction
disclosure of their terms ....
Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive
Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REv. 1805, 1806-07 (2000). The full terms of insurance policies are also
often provided to consumers only after the consumer has purchased the insurance. Victor P.
Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461, 484 n.50
(1974); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 540 (1971).
Manufacturers typically insert consumer warranties inside a product's box. Goldberg,
supra, at 484 n.50; Slawson, supra, at 541. This practice seems slightly less troublesome
because of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act's provisions and its implementing regulations
requiring sellers to make copies of warranties available before purchase, see 15 U.S.C. §
2302(b)(1) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 702.3 (2005), though whether many consumers know they have
a right to inspect warranties before making a purchase is unclear. Moreover, whether sellers
are living up to their obligations under the statute is also unclear. Cf. Sternlight, supra note
39, at 12 n.12 (reporting that "persistent attempts to procure a copy of the arbitration
provision from Gateway sales and customer service representatives did not prove productive").
42. See Braucher, supra note 41, at 1810.
[D] elayed disclosure ... inhibits shopping, making it an anti-competitive practice
.... To find the best deal, a customer would have to engage in repetitive
purchases, undoing one at a time and then searching for a better one, not
knowing if the deal just reversed is the best available. To use economic
terminology, delayed disclosure increases transaction costs dramatically....
Furthermore, delayed disclosure often goes hand in hand with merchant
decisions not to compete. If merchants decide not to compete concerning certain
terms ... they have every incentive to hold back that information until after
payment so as not to drive away customers.
Id. The point may be only slightly overstated. Consumers who want to know the terms under
which merchants will sell could probably learn those terms by asking the merchant. The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act obliges merchants to supply warranty terms upon request, see
15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1) (2000); see also 16 C.F.R. § 702.3 (2005), and probably most, if asked,
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The second way Gateway increased consumer transaction costs
to its advantage was by requiring consumers unhappy with the
terms of sale to repack the computer and return it. Gateway thus
significantly increased the costs faced by consumers in objecting to
the contract terms.43
Third, any consumers who did wade through the three-page,
sixteen-paragraph contract learned from the tenth paragraph that
disputes arising out of the agreement were to be submitted to
arbitration." Critics have pointed out that consumers are unlikely
to appreciate the full significance of terms providing for binding
arbitration;45 indeed, even for them to try may be irrational, given
will furnish other terms simply as a matter of good customer relations. Undoubtedly, however,
few consumers will think to ask. Moreover, when firms do not make the terms of their
contracts readily available, fewer consumers will learn those terms.
43. See Sternlight, supra note 39, at 12 (claiming this was a "dramatic and expensive step
of returning the brand new computer"); see also Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939
F.2d 91, 102 (3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting the claim in a similar case that terms enclosed with the
goods bound the purchaser and that if the purchaser did not agree to the terms, the purchaser
had to return the goods within a set period, while acknowledging that "the [seller] may be
relying on the purchaser's investment in time and energy in reaching this point in the
transaction to prevent the purchaser from returning the item").
44. Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 248, 252-53, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 570, 573. Gateway is hardly
unusual in including arbitration clauses in its agreements. See, e.g., Joan Lowy, Consumers
Are Losing the Right to Sue Without Knowing It, ScRipps HOWARD NEWS SERV., May 2, 2000
(noting that one bank "sent a dense notice in small type to its 40 million credit card customers
informing them that they were giving up their right to go to court in favor of arbitration
unless customers responded in writing within the next three weeks").
45. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print To Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIs. L. REv. 33, 56-57.
[Pre-dispute arbitration clauses] are, in substance, immaterial to the core of the
transaction, which would typically center around price .... They thus receive
little attention from the adherent. Even if the adherent bothers to read and
understand the arbitration clause, she is extremely unlikely to be able to assess
the value of a judicial forum for future disputes with the drafting party. Unlike
the drafting party, who has had such disputes before, and has probably
experienced both arbitration and litigation, the adherent is unlikely to have had
any such experience and is also unlikely to undertake the time and expense to
research the implications of an arbitration clause or obtain legal advice. In her
ignorant position, the adherent is most likely to undervalue the right to a
judicial forum.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013,
1017 (Ariz. 1992) (holding an arbitration agreement unenforceable when consumer was not
told that she was giving up the right to jury trial and the agreement was not explained to her;
consumer was not sure what arbitration meant); Braucher, supra note 41, at 1814; Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 676 (1996). Thus, consumers are unlikely to understand
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the cost of learning enough to evaluate all the terms in a standard
form contract 46 and the low likelihood that a consumer would end up
in a dispute that required arbitration.47 Some consumer attorneys
refuse to take on a contingent-fee basis arbitration cases that they
otherwise would have if the cases could have been heard in court.
Hence, consumers unable to finance litigation cannot obtain redress
because the cost of asserting their rights-a transaction cost-is too
high.48
Fourth, the arbitration clause provided that the arbitration was
to be governed by the rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC).49 The ICC rules required payment of an advance
fee of $4000 before claims of less than $50,000 would be heard; of
that discovery is often limited in arbitration and that because class actions are unusual in
arbitration, an agreement to arbitrate is likely to make litigation uneconomical. Braucher,
supra note 41, at 1855-56; Sternlight, supra, at 683. See generally Michael I. Meyerson, The
Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1270 (1993) ("[Consumers] generally lack the legal background to
understand the subordinate clauses.").
46. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 600 (1990) ("It is, therefore, rational for even a
conscientious consumer to pay little, if any, attention to subordinate contract terms."); cf.
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection
Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 486-87 (1992) ("[Ilt would be
irrational for consumers to absorb the costs of identifying and evaluating such technical
contractual provisions [as forum selection clauses].").
47. See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of
Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 700, 717 (1992) ('The costs
of obtaining and understanding information about contract terms are especially daunting
when the form terms involve risks that are unlikely to occur."); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1226 (1983) ("[Many of the
terms [in standard form contracts] concern risks that in any individual transaction are
unlikely to eventuate. It is notoriously difficult for most people, who lack legal advice and
broad experience concerning the particular transaction type, to appraise these sorts of
contingencies.").
48. Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print: 'You Can't Sue Us,' WASH. POST, May 22,
1999, at Al. Some evidence suggests that arbitration clauses in consumer contracts reduce
the number of claims consumers file. See ERIK MOLLER, ELIZABETH S. ROLPH & PATRICIA
EBENER, PRIVATE DisPuTE RESOLUTION IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 22-23 (1993) (reporting the
results of a study by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice that found that "new arbitrable
litigation decreased markedly after the introduction of' arbitration requirements). Thus,
arbitration clauses themselves seem to pose an impediment to consumers seeking to resolve
a disagreement, suggesting that they effectively function as a transaction cost, perhaps for
the reasons stated in the text.
49. Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 248, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
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that fee, $2000 was nonrefundable even if the consumer prevailed.50
In addition, the ICC rules provided that the loser of the arbitration
must compensate the victor for legal fees,5' thus making it possible
for consumers to incur additional expenses if they invoked arbitra-
tion. The cost of successful arbitration ($2000 nonrefundable filing
fee, plus any other costs incurred in pressing the claim) may well
exceed the computer's value. The cost of unsuccessful arbitration
($4000 filing fee, plus Gateway's legal expenses, plus any other
costs) surely would. Gateway effectively increased the cost of
dispute resolution to the point where it made little sense even for
consumers whose claims were clearly meritorious to assert them.52
Fifth, even consumers who grasped what arbitration entailed
would not have learned from the contract the cost of filing for
arbitration because that cost was not stated.53 Thus, a consumer
who noticed the arbitration clause and wanted to know the cost of
filing for arbitration would have had to research the cost of assert-
ing her rights. Even assuming that consumers knew how to research
the filing fee question, it seems unlikely that any consumer would,
especially given that psychological studies suggest that consumers
understate the risk of nonperformance by the sellers.54 In other
words, any consumers who realized that they were agreeing to a
contract did not know exactly what they were agreeing to, thus
giving Gateway the opportunity to insert whatever terms it wanted
in the contract.
50. Id. at 249-50, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
51. Id.
52. Cf Sterlight, supra note 45, at 683 (suggesting that filing fees are used to increase
consumer transaction costs; the author reports that, "As one lawyer noted, at least when one
goes to court the judge is free."); Lowy, supra note 44 ("Arbitration fees can be prohibitive,
especially for consumers with small claims. A Tiling fee' of $100 or more is common, as are
hourly arbiter fees that can run into the thousands of dollars."). But see Christopher R.
Drahozal, 'Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 698 (arguing that pre-
dispute arbitration clauses benefit consumers).
53. The arbitration provision established that International Chamber of Commerce rules
would govern any proceedings, but it did not relate the content of those rules. Brower, 246
A.D.2d at 248, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
54. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 1165, 1179 (2003). But cf Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty:
Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633, 705-06 (2001) (arguing
that contracting parties may overestimate the risk of future breach if they recently
experienced a breach of contract).
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Sixth, the contract provided that arbitration was to take place in
Chicago, Illinois, thus adding travel costs to the cost consumers
faced in asserting their rights.5" For many consumers, the cost of
travel alone, much less the filing fee, might be enough to make them
forego arbitration.56
55. Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 248,676 N.Y.S.2d at 570; see also Sternlight, supra note 45, at
682 (noting that companies increase consumer transaction costs by obliging consumers to
bring actions in distant forums). Edward Purcell has observed that
[florum-selection clauses are tactical devices that enable companies to cast
heavy burdens and costs on consumers while conserving their own resources and
guaranteeing themselves an unrelenting leverage against their adversaries....
In economic terms, forum-selection clauses may be understood as a rational
method whereby companies multiply the transaction costs that litigation
imposes on those with claims against them in order to force such claimants to
discount or abandon their claims, thereby enabling the companies to externalize
a higher percentage of their overall costs of operation.
Purcell, supra note 46, at 455. He further explained the cost of litigating in a distant
jurisdiction as follows:
The deterrent effects of geography are numerous and weighty. The threshold
task of merely retaining counsel in a distant location ... is profoundly daunting
to ordinary people.... Once litigation begins, the process quickly piles on
additional burdens. One is the obvious need to travel and communicate over long
distances .... Mhese burdens will be especially heavy if the plaintiffs claim
arises from events in his home state and many or all of his witnesses reside
there.... [Pisychologically the claimant feels more cut off, more vulnerable, and
even more anxious than he otherwise would. That burden is magnified by the
fact that the attorneys representing his corporate adversary feel relatively
comfortable and secure litigating in their home court.... [Tihey will tend to drive
a harder bargain, [and] hold off settling for a longer period in the hope of
obtaining increasingly more favorable terms ....
Id. at 446-49 (footnotes omitted). This apparently is not a new strategy for merchants. See
Craig Karpel, Ghetto Fraud on the Installment Plan (pt. 2), N.Y. MAG., June 2, 1969, at 41
("[MKerchants and finance companies often sue, not in the county where they reside or in the
county where the defendant resides, but in some other county which is likely to be
inconvenient for ghetto consumers to get to.'). Perhaps because of the litigation spawned by
its contracting practices, Gateway now makes the standard terms of its contracts available
on its website. See GATEWAY, INC., GATEWAY STANDARD TERMS OF SALE (2005), httpJ/content.
gateway.com/www.gateway.com/about/legal/warranties/8510858.pdf. The contract still
provides for mandatory arbitration, but Gateway promises to reimburse consumers who
prevail in the arbitration for their filing fees. Id. at para. 6. The consumer may choose to
conduct the arbitration online, on the phone, by submission of documents, or in person at any
reasonable location near the consumer's residence. Id. The arbitration term also explains in
bold print that the consumer, by agreeing to the provision, is waiving the right to proceed in
court or to bring a class action. Id.
56. Cf. Purcell, supra note 46, at 486 ("The primary result of [a Court enforcing forum-
selection clauses] will most likely be to eliminate suits ... and to deny forums ....").
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3. Interlocking Ways To Inflate Transaction Costs
In sum, Gateway increased both the cost of backing out of the
transaction and resolving any disputes so much that many consum-
ers would have been better off swallowing their losses and moving
on, rather than attempting to proceed against Gateway. Brower also
demonstrates another one of the remarkable things about the
phenomenon of inflated consumer transaction costs: the way the
methods interlock to inflate the cost of avoiding still another
method. For example, Gateway's practice of obscuring the terms of
the contract made it more difficult for consumers to discover that
they had to return the computer within a limited time period or else
be bound by those terms. It also made it less likely that consumers
would realize that the terms of the contract might be unattractive,
thereby reducing their motivation to return the computer. Similarly,
the requirement that consumers unhappy with the terms of the
contract go to the effort of repacking and returning the computer
rather than just withdrawing from the contract before the computer
was sent increases the likelihood that even a consumer who learned
of the binding arbitration in time to object to it would not bother to
rescind the deal. In turn, the expense of resolving disputes through
costly binding arbitration in a distant forum prevents consumers
from complaining about Gateway's contracting practices, including
the practices described above. The net effect of these practices is to
insulate much of Gateway's contract from market competition,
which means that Gateway is free to behave monopolistically in
crafting certain terms for its contract.
4. Externalities and Internalities
Brower also illustrates two different types of transaction cost
increases. In the first type, the merchant's conduct imposes an
externality upon the consumer, a cost that the consumer either
overlooked or underestimated in entering into the contract. The
delayed disclosure of the terms, which increases the consumer's
costs in comparing terms offered by rival computer dealers, is an
example.
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The second type of transaction cost increase depends on what
have been dubbed "internalities,"7 that is, systematic consumer
behaviors that function as if consumers are imposing externalities
upon themselves. These internalities have been analogized to
transaction costs and explain why "bounded rationality" often seems
more bounded than rational.5" Ordinarily, it seems unfair to lay
responsibility for consumer failures at the feet of merchants. But
when companies are aware of these tendencies and take advantage
of them in structuring their dealings with consumers, it appears
appropriate to view the merchants' behavior as a deliberate attempt
to inflate consumer transaction costs.
For example, by putting consumers in a position where they had
to return the computer if they were dissatisfied, rather than simply
notifying consumers of the contract terms in advance, Gateway
took advantage of two related internalities. The first is what
psychologists call the status quo effect, the preference to stay with
the status quo even when it is randomly determined,59 and the
second is the endowment effect, the tendency of consumers to want
to retain possessions they have had even for a short time. 0 As Jon
57. Colin Camerer, Samual Issacharoff, George Lowenstein, Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew
Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 'Asymmetric
Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211, 1221 & n.30 (2003); R. J. Herrnstein, George F.
Loewenstein, Drazen Prelec & William Vaughan, Jr., Utility Maximization and Melioration:
Internalities in Individual Choice, 6 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 149, 150 (1993).
58. See Rachlinski, supra note 54, at 1225.
59. Raymond S. Hartman, Michael J. Duane & Chi-Keung Woo, Consumer Rationality
and the Status Quo, 106 Q.J. ECON. 141, 143-44 (1991); Eric J. Johnson, John Hershey,
Jacqueline Meszaros & Howard Kunreuther, Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance
Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AN) FRAMES 224,235-37 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky
eds., 2000); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197 (1991)
("[Iindividuals have a strong tendency to remain at the status quo ..... ); William Samuelson
& Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8
(1988) ("[Dlecision makers exhibit a significant status quo bias."). Changes in Pennsylvania
and New Jersey insurance laws illustrate the preference. Johnson et al., supra, at 238. Both
states passed laws permiting motorists to retain a right to sue in exchange for higher
insurance rates. Id. Pennsylvania motorists started with the right to sue at the higher rate,
a right approximately seventy-five percent opted to keep. Id. New Jersey drivers started with
a restricted right to sue at a lower rate, and only about twenty percent selected the greater
right to sue. Id. Thus, for the vast majority of drivers, the initial allocation of rights
determined the choice. Id. For other situations in which the default choice influenced the final
choice, see Sovern, supra note 28, at 1092.
60. A series of experiments reported by Jack Knetsch illustrate the endowment effect.
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D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar have written, "[by] simply getting
the product into the hands of the consumer, its value to that
consumer may be enhanced." 61 Psychologists have also demon-
strated that consumers tend to underestimate the impact of
these effects on their valuations, so that consumers tend to value
something more when they possess it than they anticipated. For
example, a consumer who actually possessed the computer would be
more reluctant to part with it than a consumer who merely
contemplated having one.62 Consequently, a consumer who might
not have ordered a computer if she saw Gateway's terms in advance
might choose to retain it if she did not receive the terms until she
had the computer.63
Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves,
in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 59, at 171. In one experiment, subjects were
given a coffee mug and invited to trade it for a candy bar; eighty-nine percent preferred the
mug. Id at 172-73. Another group of subjects were provided with a candy bar and invited to
exchange it for a mug; ninety percent of that group preferred the candy bar. Id. In other
words, the subjects preferred ownership of an object they had possessed even fleetingly over
something they did not yet have. See also Kahneman et al., supra note 59, at 194-97
(detailing additional experiments); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325,
1342 (1990) (referring to this phenomenon as an "instant endowment effect"). The same trait,
carried over to a computer in the consumer's possession, may lead consumers to retain the
computer even though, had they known the terms before the purchase, they might not have
bought it.
61. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 734 (1999). Richard Thaler has made a similar
observation:
Consider the case of a two week trial period with a money back guarantee. At
the first decision point the consumer thinks he can lose at most the transactions
costs of taking the good home and back. If the transactions costs are less than
the value of the utilization of the good for two weeks, then the maximizing
consumer pays for the good and takes it home. The second decision point comes
two weeks later. If the consumer has fully adapted to the purchase, he views the
cost of keeping the good as an opportunity cost. Once this happens the sale is
more likely.
Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39,
46 (1980).
62. See George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 59, at 726-34; see also Samuelson & Zeckhauser,
supra note 59, at 9 ("[Status quo] bias is considerably more subtle. In the debriefing
discussions following the experiments, subjects expressed surprise at the existence of the bias.
Most ... seemed unaware (and slightly skeptical) that they personally would fall prey to this
bias.").
63. See Roger C. Bern, 'Terms Later"Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad
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When Gateway took advantage of these effects, or of the likeli-
hood that consumers would not read the terms of the contract
because of their excitement in receiving their computer, or of the
probability that consumers would not appreciate the significance of
the arbitration clause in the absence of an explanation, Gateway
arranged its transaction so as to inflate consumer transaction costs.
Substantial evidence suggests that businesses are aware of
consumer behaviors and psychology. Indeed, manufacturers spend
billions of dollars every year studying just that.' Sellers clearly use
consumer internalities to manipulate consumers and increase
sales,65 just as Gateway did and those who offer rebates do.
Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POLY 641, 725 (2004).
Once the purchaser has the computer in hand, even if he knows of the
objectionable terms in time to resist them, he is most unlikely to do so. The
downside of parting with "his computer" (including the hassle of getting it back
into the box and shipping it back), along with the need to begin a search for its
replacement, loom much larger than the possible upside of averting potential
remedial limitations he may face if by chance the thing does not function
properly. "Foregone gains are less painful than perceived losses."
Id. (quoting Kahneman et al., supra note 59, at 203). Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar have
similarly acknowledged that
manufacturers might use money-back guarantees, test drives, thirty-day no-risk
trial periods, free samples, and other marketing ploys, all of which are designed
to create in the consumer a sense of ownership. Because of the endowment
effect, the sense of ownership by itself might lead the consumer to experience an
increased valuation of the product.
Hanson & Kysar, supra note 61, at 734 (footnote omitted). Similar observations have also
been made in the business management literature by Gerald E. Smith and Thomas T. Nagle:
[I] t is often better to decouple product acquisition and payment by first endowing
buyers with the product. If buyers can be persuaded to take the product home,
they will adjust their reference point to include the newly acquired asset. They
will then be reluctant to return the product when payment is due, since this will
require that they incur a loss.
Gerald E. Smith & Thomas T. Nagle, Frames of Reference and Buyers'Perceptions of Price and
Value, 38 CAL. MGMT. REv. 98, 101 (1995).
64. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 6, at 1429-37 (citing studies performed by marketing
professionals).
65. Id. at 1432-33, 1439-67 (giving many examples of sellers using consumer behavior and
psychology to manipulate consumers).
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5. Internalities and Rebates
Though internalities will be discussed more fully below,6" a brief
discussion about how rebates also take advantage of consumer
internalities may be helpful at this point. Prospect theory has
established that consumers are more sensitive to losses than
gains.6" When a consumer makes a purchase, the price looks like a
loss, and so the consumer experiences the rebate as a "reduction in
pain," which makes the rebate attractive. By the time the consumer
contemplates the work required to obtain the rebate, however, the
rebate seems less like a reduction of a loss and more like a gain,
thereby making the rebate appear less important.68 The result is
that sellers have manipulated consumers into buying to secure a
rebate the consumers never seek.
Psychological experiments with rebates confirm that rebates are
ripe for manipulation. In one experiment, researchers asked
subjects whether they would pay a premium of $1000 for compre-
hensive and collision car insurance that included a deductible of
$600.69 Another group was asked whether they would pay $1600 for
the same coverage, except that the policy provided for payment of a
$600 rebate at the end of the year if the driver had not made any
claims; if the driver asserted claims, the rebate would be reduced by
the amount of the claims up to $600. ' The first offer is economically
preferable because it does not require the insured to make a $600
interest-free loan to the insurer.' Nevertheless, more than two-
66. See infra notes 141, 143-48 and accompanying text.
67. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). Edward J. McCaffery has contributed the
following observation:
For example, people will not use credit cards if a merchant advertises a 3
percent penalty for using them, but they will do so if the same merchant
advertises a 3 percent bonus for using cash: Being penalized appears worse than
forsaking a bonus, although the two outcomes are economically equivalent.
Similarly, people consistently attach more disutility to losing a sum of money or
a valuable possession than they do to failing to gain the same sum or good.
Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 398,
401 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
68. See Seligman, supra note 9.
69. Johnson et al., supra note 59, at 232-34.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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thirds of the respondents said yes to the second offer, while
fewer than half agreed to the first offer, a statistically significant
difference.72 Thus, the rebate clouded the decision-making process
in such a way as to lead to a less beneficial result.
A second rebate experiment makes the point even more clearly.
Subjects were offered disability policies that would pay two-thirds
of their salary.73 One policy had a monthly cost of $90 and provided
a rebate of $1200 to insureds who did not make a claim within five
years; the other policy cost only $70 per month but did not provide
for a rebate.74 Under the first policy, insureds would make sixty
payments of $90 totaling $5400. 75 Subtracting the $1200 rebate
yields a net payment of $4200.76 An insured who chose the second
policy would make total payments of $4200 as well (sixty payments
of $70). 77 But an insured who chose the second policy would not risk
losing $1200 if she made a claim, and in addition, she would have
the use of the money earlier, making the second policy a better
choice.78 Nevertheless, more respondents preferred the rebate
policy. 79 The promise of a rebate thus appears to leave consumers
muddled. This is itself a transaction cost.
6. Small Print (and the Internet's Equivalent) as a Transaction
Cost
Gateway's attempt to conceal the terms of its contracts by
increasing consumer transaction costs is hardly unique. Probably
the best-known example is the practice of some firms of placing
unfavorable terms in small print, or perhaps in the middle of a sea
of fine print, to reduce the likelihood that consumers will read the
72. Id.
73. Id. at 234-35.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. A consumer might prefer having money at an earlier time for at least two reasons.
First, the consumer could invest the money, so that at the end of the insurance policy term
she would have even more money available. Second, because of inflation, the purchasing
power of a dollar at the outset of the policy term is likely to be greater than its purchasing
power at the term's end.
79. Id.
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terms and so decline to enter into the contract.8 ° The use of fine
print is so universally accepted that consumers do not seem to hold
it against firms, and so businesses rarely lose goodwill by using it.
Though the Internet has facilitated many communications, it has
not ended the use of fine print to conceal unfavorable terms."' For
80. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 432-33, 446 (2002) ("Businesses ... know 0 that
consumers reliably, predictably, and completely fail to read the terms employed in standard-
form contracts.... Businesses also can create boilerplate that is difficult to read by using small
print, a light font, and all-capital lettering and by burying important terms in the middle of
the form."); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1983)
("[Clonsumers may not understand the legal relationships that their purchase contracts
create because they do not read the language in those contracts. Firms have an incentive to
exploit this ignorance by using 'hidden' terms that will disadvantage consumers if
circumstances cause these terms to be invoked."); see also Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure
of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV.
215, 273 (1990) ("[T]erms are often written in fine print to economize on paper and handling,
and expressed obscurely or in legal or technical jargon, which raises the cost of becoming
acquainted with them even further."); Meyerson, supra note 45, at 1270 ("[Blusinesses do not
want consumers to read [contracts] prior to signing."); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning
of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PIT. L. REV. 21,
27 (1984) ("[Blusinesses know full well that their forms will not generally be read, let alone
understood."). Small print does not necessarily mean form contracts, as forms need not be in
small print that is difficult or uninviting to read. For example, the "Federal Box" mandated
by the regulations implementing the Truth in Lending Act is undeniably a form, but is not
intended to be unreadable; in fact, the converse is true. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.17 (2005)
(indicating that disclosures must be made "clearly and conspicuously").
81. See Braucher, supra note 41, at 1807.
Effectiveness of disclosure on the Web is also a big problem. Those businesses
that do post their terms online often use this medium to make standard forms
harder to find, longer, and less readable. To reach terms on a Web site, a
consumer usually has to click on a button, uninvitingly labeled "legal" or "terms
and conditions" and obscurely placed, for example, at the very bottom of a long
Web page. Assuming the consumer clicks, the terms are often presented in
multi-page scroll-down formats with unreadable paragraphs of block letters and
incomprehensible legalese.
Id.; see also Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980-82 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (denying
a motion to dismiss a breach of contract claim when the defendant claimed it had not
consented to a license agreement because "[niotice of the license agreement [was] provided
by small gray text on a gray background" on the plaintiffs website and despite acknowledging
that "many visitors to the site may not be aware of the license agreement"); Margot Saunders,
A Case Study of the Challenge of Designing Effective Electronic Consumer Credit Disclosures:
The Interim Rule for the Truth in Lending Act, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 39, 43-44 (2003)
(describing a scenario involving e-commerce that could occur under the Federal Reserve
Board's Interim Rule on Regulation Z in which a consumer does not get a paper copy of her
right to rescind the transaction and an electronic copy is effectively unavailable to her because
she lacks a computer or URL for the website informing her of her right to rescind, thus
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example, few consumers are likely to understand that when they
agree to the terms and conditions on the website known as
GoHip-which offers free videos, among other services-their web
browser home page will become the GoHip web page, advertise-
ments for GoHip will be added to their email, and advertisements
for GoHip will appear on their monitor at various times.82 Similarly,
consumers who click on the "I agree" box on an end user license
agreement may allow a company to put spyware on their com-
puter-software which may permit distant companies to monitor
computer use and permit popup ads to appear on a consumer's
computer screen. In the words of Professor John Soma, "There is no
full disclosure of what's in these programs. If there is, it's in the
37th footnote in the back of a long and boring legal document no one
will read.... That is not meaningful disclosure."83
When PC Pitstop, a marketer of anti-spyware services, surveyed
7260 computer users with Gator or GAIN (Gator Advertising
Information Network) applications installed on their computers, it
found that 74.2% did not recall installing Gator or a GAIN applica-
tion; 14.9% had not read the license agreement; 8.5% had read the
license agreement for no more than five minutes; and fewer than 3%
had spent more than five minutes reading the license agreement, a
increasing transaction costs for consumers who wish to rescind). Kaustuv M. Das offered the
following example:
[Visitors to NBC.com's website may not notice the hyperlink labeled "Privacy
& TOS" among the list of hyperlinks at the bottom of the webpage.... [Elven if
a visitor to the site were able to figure out that TOS referred to "terms of
service," they may be misled by the fact that clicking on the hyperlink brings up
a page entitled "NBC Online Privacy Policy." It is only upon scrolling down a
number of screens that a visitor would find a statement specifying that: "USE
OF THIS SITE SIGNIFIES YOUR AGREEMENT TO THE TERMS OF USE
AND PRIVACY POLICY." Upon scrolling down further to the fifteenth
numbered paragraph, labeled "Miscellaneous," a visitor would find that he or
she had consented to exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of New York, New York,
U.S.A.
Kaustuv M. Das, Note, Forum-Selection Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and Browsewrap
Agreements and the "Reasonably Communicated" Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481, 499 (2002)
(footnotes omitted).
82. Dave Peyton, Proceed Cautiously When Downloading from GoHip, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23,
2000, at 7.
83. Michael Bologna, Special Report, Cybersecurity, Spyware's Harms, Benefits, Cures
Debated as Legislation Emerges, FTC Workshop Nears, 3 PRIVACY & SEC. L. REP. 407, 409
(2004).
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document that PC Pitstop estimated would take the average reader
at least twenty minutes to read.' That many consumers would
knowingly agree to the placement of spyware on their computers
seems unlikely, but by increasing consumer transaction costs,
companies are able to create the illusion of consumer agreement.
Websites also offer a special advantage to businesses that desire
to make the terms of their contracts less obvious: because firms can
measure "hits" on particular pages, they can determine which
formats generate the fewest hits, and then use those formats to
obscure terms that the firm would rather consumers not see. 5
Though consumers shopping on Websites can take as long as they
like to review contract terms and may do so in the privacy of their
own home, 6 unlimited time offers no advantage to those who simply
overlook obscure terms.
7. Use of Transaction Costs To Conceal Changes in Contract
Terms
In addition to using transaction costs to conceal contract terms
at the beginning of contractual relationships, merchants also
employ transaction costs that cause consumers to overlook changes
in the terms of ongoing contractual arrangements. Companies that
send periodic bills to consumers, such as credit card issuers,
utilities, and cable television providers, sometimes include with the
bills documents known as "bill-stuffers" to, for example, change
contract terms materially 7 or notify consumers of their privacy
84. PC Pitstop, Survey Says: Gator Users Didn't Know, httpJ/www.pcpitstop.com/gator/
Survey.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2006).
85. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 80, at 479, 483 ("If a website configuration deters
consumers from reading standard terms that consumers reasonably would find unpalatable,
then such a configuration might increase sales.").
86. Id. at 492.
87. See Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811 (2003) ("[A] reasonable class
member would not have expected the billing statement to contain a new contract, and
therefore might well have discarded the [consumer services agreement] as a stuffer."); Badie
v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing which bill-
stuffer provided that disputes were to be settled by binding arbitration); John J. A. Burke,
Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SEMON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 322 (2000)
("[Tihe credit card industry frequently sends a written notice of change in contract terms
along with the monthly statement."); Mayer, supra note 48 (reporting that American Express
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rights."8 Sometimes the bill-stuffer, often in the form of a colorless,
uninteresting-looking document that may be mistaken for junk
mail, 9 accompanies other items likely to be of greater interest to
consumers, such as a statement of how much is owed, forthcoming
features on pay-per-view, and the like. These more interesting
papers obscure the bill-stuffer. By making it more difficult for the
consumer to learn the terms of the transaction, the company
increases the likelihood that the consumer will approve the changes
or perhaps unknowingly act in a way that signifies approval.
The above examples all have certain common characteristics. This
Article now turns to the conditions under which firms can and will
inflate consumer transaction costs.
II. CONDITIONS FOR INFLATION OF CONSUMER TRANSACTION COSTS
Six conditions must be present before a rational firm will
deliberately inflate consumer transaction costs. First, and most
obviously, the firm must benefit from the consumer's refraining
from certain conduct, such as sending in a rebate form, requesting
privacy, backing out of a contract, or seeking to resolve a dispute.
Second, the firm must be able to increase consumer transaction
costs by, for example, requiring the consumer to fill out a difficult
form or by burying terms in fine print.
Third, the conduct must be something consumers will forego if
the transaction costs can be made high enough. Rational consum-
ers will engage in a transaction until the costs of doing so exceed
the transaction's benefits. Accordingly, if a business can inflate
consumer transaction costs to the point that the costs exceed
the benefits from engaging in the transaction, a rational consumer
will abandon the transaction. In some circumstances, significant
transaction costs do not deter consumers. For example, the process
included a mandatory arbitration provision in a bill-stuffer described as "routine, even
innocuous-the typical fine print that's usually stuffed in the same envelope with the monthly
bill and often thrown away").
88. See Sovern, supra note 28, at 1085.
89. Sternlight, supra note 45, at 691 ("Arbitration clauses are often buried in seemingly
insignificant places, camouflaged as insignificant junk mail...."); Robert Alexander Schwartz,
Note, Can Arbitration Do More for Consumers? The TILA Class Action Reconsidered, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 830-31 (2003).
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of purchasing a home and obtaining a mortgage can be time
consuming and expensive, yet many consumers undertake that
process because the benefits of home ownership are so great. This
implies that the consumer's benefits from engaging in the transac-
tion the business wishes to discourage must not be so significant
that the consumer is willing to incur substantial transaction costs
to obtain those benefits. Obtaining a modest rebate or protecting
personal privacy fits that description for many consumers.
Fourth, merchants should not inflate consumer transaction costs
if doing so reduces total profits (including profits generated from
future sales) more than the gains from the practice itself.9" For
example, merchants who depend on repeat sales to the same
consumers are unlikely to do things that anger consumers enough
to drive them away. Even businesses that do not depend on repeat
sales may be restrained from misbehavior by the prospect of a poor
reputation costing them sales.9' This reality undoubtedly deters
many firms from inflating consumer transaction costs in certain
ways, but many practices nevertheless do not generate consumer
ire. Thus, few consumers seem to blame the manufacturer for the
consumer's own failure to send in the rebate form. Hence, the
manufacturer obtains the added revenue without losing future
sales. Similarly, as noted above, consumers accept small print as a
way of doing business and are unlikely to hold it against firms.92
Gateway's practice of requiring the consumer to pay for arbitration
in a distant forum as a way of increasing the cost of resolving
disputes also probably does not cost it sales to that consumer
because any consumer angry enough at Gateway to consider
arbitration is unlikely to buy from Gateway again anyway.93
90. Cf Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1240 (2003) ("As long as the long-term costs exceed
the short-term benefits, sellers will not, in fact, find it to be in their self-interest to offer
inefficient terms.").
91. Cf Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 80, at 442 ("Businesses must worry that if they
consistently include and enforce terms that exploit consumers [in their contracts], they will
develop an unsavory reputation, just as if they offered shoddy goods or services."); Muris,
supra note 28, at 12 ("Market factors, such as a business's concerns about repeat business and
reputation, can ... overcome some of the incentives a seller might otherwise have to dishonor
its agreements.").
92. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
93. Conceivably, the consumer might tell friends about Gateway's practice and so cost
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Fifth, the consumer must either overlook or underestimate the
cost at the time the consumer enters into the transaction. This
condition is related to the sixth condition: namely, that the market
must have failed to create competition from a seller who would
provide the good or service without inflated transaction costs. In
theory, when a company perceives that other firms inflate consumer
transaction costs, the company should compete on the basis that it
does not do so." Consumers who care about artificially increased
transaction costs should respond by patronizing companies that do
not impose inflated transaction costs, just as they would avoid any
company that overcharges. Indeed, increasing transaction costs is
one form of overcharging."
A. Lack of Competition To Reduce Transaction Costs in the
Marketplace
The short response to this theoretical consideration is that in the
consumer product market producers at least sometimes do not
Gateway business through word of mouth, but Gateway likely made a judgment that the loss
of sales through word of mouth about its practice would be less costly than using other
mechanisms for resolving disputes would be. In any event, additional damage to Gateway's
reputation from consumers troubled by the arbitration clause is likely to be no greater than
the damage from consumers who are unhappy enough with their computers to seek
arbitration. Cf. R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an
Informed Minority To Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 663 (1996)
("[Clonsumers do not often get 'burnt,' and thus a manufacturer will not lose much repeat or
referral business the few times it does occur."); Korobkin, supra note 90, at 1240 ("The costs
of this small number of defections, however, [are] likely to be outweighed by the benefits
gained from use of the inefficient term in contracts with the far larger number of buyers for
whom the term never becomes salient.").
94. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 116 (Aspen Publishers 6th ed.
2003) (1973) ("If one seller offers unattractive terms, a competing seller, wanting sales for
himself, will offer more attractive terms."); Korobkin, supra note 90, at 1208 ("Economic
analysis suggests that in a perfectly functioning market with complete information contracts
between buyers and sellers will contain only efficient terms ...."); Sternlight, supra note 45,
at 687 ("[Flree marketeers argue that if the terms of consumer contracts were in fact unduly
and inefficiently biased toward the supplier, then other suppliers, in order to benefit
themselves, would step in and offer a contractual provision that treated the consumer more
generously.").
95. Cf Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 80, at 441 ("Consumers concerned about the
possibility of exploitation can try to avoid terms they consider exploitative and refuse to
transact with businesses that have reputations for offering and enforcing manipulative
contract terms.").
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compete on the basis that they offer lower transaction costs. Two
examples make the point. The first is the quotation of interest rates
prior to enactment of the Truth in Lending Act.96 Different lenders
quoted interest rates on consumer loans in different ways. Some
used the dollar add-on method; some used the discount basis; others
stated a monthly rate as applied to a defined balance; and still
others combined different methods.97 Consumers could not compare
rates calculated by one method to rates determined by another
method without going through complex calculations, which were
beyond the skills of most consumers.9" As a result, consumers
attempting to shop for the lowest rates found it difficult to do so. In
theory, in a competitive lending market, the lenders offering the
lowest rates should have found a way to communicate that to
consumers, perhaps by quoting rates in all of the various ways
lenders used, so that consumers could compare their rates to those
of other lenders.
If the lenders charging the lowest rates had found an effective
way to let consumers know that they were the cheapest, the Truth
in Lending Act might never have come into existence, or might have
been enacted in a different form.99 But for whatever reason, the
96. Consumer Credit Protection Act §§ 101-114, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13); see also 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (2005) (implementing
certain provisions of the Truth in Lending Act).
97. NATL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 169-70
(1972); see also Jonathan M. Landers & Cathleen Chandler, The Truth in Lending Act and
Variable-Rate Mortgages and Balloon Notes, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 35,65 ("[C]onsumers'
knowledge of the cost of credit [was] woefully inadequate...."). But see Homer Kripke, Gesture
and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1969) ("[The middle class
buyer has already learned where credit is cheapest."); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 681 (1979) ("[Clonsumers apparently knew that finance companies
charged higher rates than banks ..... ).
98. See OEO LEGAL SERV. TRAINING PROGRAM, MEMORANDUM (Apr. 1972), reprinted in
JOHN A. SPANOGLE, RALPH J. ROHNER, DEE PRIDGEN & PAUL B. RASOR, CONSUMER LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 108, 108-10 (2d ed. 1991) (demonstrating that a loan of $100 for one year
payable in twelve monthly installments at 8% calculated by various methods would yield 8%
APR under the actuarial method, 14.45% APR under the add-on method, and 15.68% APR
under the discount method).
99. The Truth in Lending Act addressed the problem of comparison shopping in a number
of ways. Requiring lenders to quote rates calculated by the same method was one way. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1632 (2000). One of the purposes of the Truth in Lending Act is "to assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit." 15
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market did not supply the information consumers needed to
compare loan prices. °0 It took regulation to do that. If the market
did not reduce transaction costs in quoting the price of credit, which
can amount to thousands of dollars over the life of a loan, it can be
expected that other arenas will exist in which merchants do not
compete on the ground that they offer lower transaction costs.
A second example is more recent. In 1999, Congress passed the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, requiring each consumer financial
institution to notify its customers of its privacy practices and allow
consumers to opt out of the sale of their personal information in
certain circumstances. 10' Polls had consistently demonstrated that
many consumers were concerned about the trade in their personal
information long before Congress acted. 02 Yet banks for the most
part did not compete on the basis of privacy though it appears
that at least some banks sold information about their customers. 03
U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
100. Cf Landers & Chandler, supra note 97, at 64 ("Congress thought that consumers
ought to have certain basic information regarding consumer credit transactions .... Consumers
ought to have the information simply because rational consumers would want it, and most
consumers lack the bargaining power to get it from creditors without statutory mandate or
the ability to compute it themselves.").
101. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). The relevant provisions are codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000).
102. For discussion and summaries of a number of polls on consumer privacy, see Mike
Hatch, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal Information from
Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457, 1477-81 (2001);
Sovern, supra note 28, at 1056-64; see also Lawrence A. Young, The Landscape of Privacy, 55
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4, 4 (2001) ("[Clonsumers were becoming alarmed that banks use
and sell financial information that many Americans consider private."); Jedediah Purdy, An
Intimate Invasion, USA WEEKEND, July 2, 2000, at 7 (reporting that seventy-nine percent of
survey respondents believed that their financial records could be accessed by too many
people).
103. Some banks were sued by regulators for failing to protect the privacy of their
customers. For example, Minnesota's attorney general sued U.S. Bancorp in January 1999
while the New York State attorney general sued the bank then known as Chase Manhattan
Bank. Both cases were settled. See Elizabeth K. Brill, Privacy and Financial Institutions:
Current Developments Concerning the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 21 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 167, 176 (2002); David W. Roderer, Tentative Steps Toward Financial Privacy, 4
N.C. BANKING INST. 209, 210-11 (2000). For a copy of the settlement order in the U.S. Bancorp
case, see Edmund Mierzwinski, Privacy Materials, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES
LITIGATION 2001 at 893, 951-61 (Practicing Law Inst. ed., 2001). Even after enactment of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, banks continue to provide customer information to third parties. An
America's Community Bankers survey found "[approximately one of every two institutions
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Few, if any, banks that publicized their privacy policies or offered
consumers the opportunity to bar the sale of their personal
information can be found."° Consumers who wished to protect the
privacy of their banking transactions had to investigate their banks'
practices and draft their own requests for privacy. To be sure, the
privacy protections afforded by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act are
flawed in that they have not eliminated all the transaction costs
imposed by financial institutions on those who would protect their
privacy,' ° but the statute does represent a significant attempt to
with assets greater than $1 billion shares information with non-affiliated third parties."ACB
Privacy Compliance Survey, WASH. PERSPECTWE, Dec. 3,2001, supp. at 1.
104. Cf Julie L. Williams, Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Address at the Financial Institutions Insurance Association Regulatory and Compliance
Conference (June 22, 1999), available at httpd/www.occ.treas.govftp/release99-59a.txt
("[Ilndividuals may not realize--and have no way of forcing disclosure of-just how their
personal information is being handled [by financial institutions]."). Similarly, Minnesota
Attorney General Mike Hatch has commented that
[w]ith little notice to their customers, many financial institutions and
telemarketers have routinely entered into marketing agreements with one
another over the past few years. These marketing agreements allow the
telemarketer to have access to bank customer information, such as names,
phone numbers, Social Security numbers, account balances, and credit limits....
[Tlhe marketing agreements have become a standard industry practice among
the country's largest financial institutions.
Hatch, supra note 102, at 1491. See also Henry Gilgoff, Private Matters: More Banks Now
Selling Personal Consumer Data, NEWSDAY, July 25, 1999, at F7 (quoting Comptroller of the
Currency John Hawke, Jr., saying that "[tihere's mounting evidence of an increase in banking
practices that are at least seamy, if not downright unfair and deceptive," and "the deals are
widespread among the country's biggest banks").
105. See Oversight Hearing on Financial Privacy and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial
Services Modernization Act Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 107th
Cong. (2002) (statement of Mike Hatch, Att'y Gen. of the State of Minnesota).
The opt-out notices flooding consumers' mailboxes ... have not meant much for
the typical consumer. The notices are dense and impenetrable. Even the most
educated and persistent of consumers would have a hard time deciphering
statements such as "we may disclose [information to] ... carefully selected
business partners (e.g., so they can alert you to valuable products and services)"
to mean the financial institution will allow telemarketers to charge your credit
card account without obtaining a signature or account number from you.
Id.; see also id. (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public
Interest Research Group), available at http'//www.privacyrights.org/A2/uspirg-glb0902.htm
(stating that privacy notices "have been widely panned by a variety of experts for their
inscrutable, dense language" and "[c]onsumers have not been adequately informed or given
effective choice"); John Schwartz, Privacy Policy Notices Are Called Too Common and Too
Confusing, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2001, at Al. One advocate concluded that
[cionsumers will have difficulty reading and understanding the privacy notices
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remove barriers to privacy, a step that banks did not seem inclined
to take absent legislation.
In both these examples, Congress acted to solve a problem the
market ignored. Given that our legislative system is famously one
of checks and balances in which the passage of statutes is difficult
and requires a sustained commitment, it seems likely that these
examples involve issues of considerable consumer concern. Yet
financial institutions did not respond to that concern by competing
over transaction costs. The lesson is that, for whatever reason,
businesses at least sometimes do not behave as market-based
predictions assume they will.
B. Why the Market Fails To Create Competition for Reduced
Transaction Costs
Why does the market break down in this way, so as to permit
businesses to inflate consumer transaction costs?" 6 Though it may
be impossible to be certain of the reasons, it is possible to identify
potential explanations for the phenomenon. In different contexts,
several factors may converge.
First, some of the relevant businesses have a monopoly. Utilities
and cable television companies, for example, usually do. Second,
they receive from their banks. The notices were supposed to [be] written in a
"clear and conspicuous" style so they would be "reasonably understandable."
Instead, the notices I reviewed were poorly written with too many long
sentences and too many uncommon words. Several notices will be illegible for
some consumers, because of basic layout and design problems. They include too
many words per line and not enough spacing between lines.
Mark Hochhauser, Lost in the Fine Print: Readability ofFinancial Privacy Notices (July 2001),
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/GLB-Reading.htm.
106. Cf. Zerbe & McCurdy, supra note 30, at 561 ("Market failures are thought to occur
when the market fails to produce public goods, or inadvertently produces externalities, or
gives rise to natural monopolies, or disenfranchises parties through information asymmetries,
or creates undesirable income distributions."). Market failures can also be classified by what
causes them:
Market failures take one of two forms. Some are external to the consumer, or
"outside the head," leading to an inability of the market to provide sufficient
options. Other failures are internal to the consumer, or "inside the head," in the
sense that they make the consumer unable to effectively choose among the
available options.
Neil. W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and
Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRuST L.J. 713, 723 (1997).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
even competitive markets may act monopolistically as to some
features. In 1979, Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde wrote of
markets that are monopolistic for terms. 17 They argued that in
markets in which enough consumers search for a particular
attribute, firms would compete for consumers by offering that
attribute. 8 If firms could not distinguish between searchers for
that attribute and nonsearchers, the firms would offer the same
terms to nonsearchers. 109 To put it another way, if firms competed
to attract searchers, nonsearchers would benefit as well."' Schwartz
and Wilde concluded that in markets in which firms compete
for searchers rigorously enough to generate optimal prices and
terms for all consumers, no regulatory intervention would be
needed."' But there are limits to the utility of this device to protect
consumers. With rebates, for example, consumers self-select, so that
consumers who are not drawn by the rebate offer provide no
protection to those who are. Many of the situations in which firms
inflate transaction costs also involve self-selecting consumers. Thus,
if some Gateway customers return their computers within thirty
days, that does nothing for other customers who retain theirs.
Similarly, those who write letters to protect their privacy typically
protect only their own rights, not the rights of others.
107. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 97.
108. Id. at 638.
109. Id.
110. For still another version, see Cruz & Hinck, supra note 93, at 646 ("[The cost of losing
the marginal consumers will outweigh the benefits of gouging the infra-marginal
consumers.").
111. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 97, at 638-39. Others have expounded on this conclusion
with regard to contract terms:
[Ilt is conceivable that if only 10 per cent of the buyers of a particular class of
goods or services studied all terms scrupulously before contracting and were
influenced in their choice of contractual offerings by their evaluation of the so-
called fine print clauses, this might create effective competitive pressures on
each supplier in the relevant market to adjust the terms of all his contracts so
as to minimize the risk of losing the potential business.
M.J. Trebilcock & D.N. Dewees, Judicial Control of Standard Form Contracts, in THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAw 93, 105 (Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 1981).
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C. Other Limits to Schwartz and Wilde's Theory
Scholars have responded to Schwartz and Wilde's arguments
by observing that in some, perhaps most, markets firms can
discriminate among buyers" 2 or renegotiate terms for aggressive
customers." 3 The theory will also fail to help consumers if searchers
seek terms that do not benefit other consumers." 4 Even with respect
to products that have some attributes that nearly all consumers
care about, such as price, consumers might not care about other
attributes, such as terms in fine print, and so might not search for
them, with the result that not enough searchers will exist to create
a market in the particular terms." 5 Not only are these terms less
112. For example, many manufacturers of consumer appliances now provide relatively
short warranty periods. Retailers offer service contracts or extended warranties for an extra
charge to consumers who want greater protection. Thus, retailers are able to discriminate
between consumers who want long-term and short-term warranties, and so consumers who
shop for long-term warranties no longer protect other consumers.
113. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 93, at 674-75 (stating that consumers who make their
displeasure known receive greater benefits from firms); Goldberg, supra note 41, at 485
(discussing the ease with which companies can renegotiate for aggressive customers but keep
the information barrier high for others); Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their
Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MICH. L. REV. 247, 264-68 (1970) (offering examples of
customers who renegotiated lease terms); Slawson, supra note 80, at 43-44 (discussing three
court decisions in which users of forms had changed terms only for parties to one transaction
rather than changing forms generally); Sternlight, supra note 45, at 691 (discussing the
possibility of firms renegotiating arbitration clauses for informed consumers). Scholars have
also speculated that Internet retailers will offer different contract terms to consumers who
read and object to standard terms. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 80, at 472. Firms
can even distinguish among complaining consumers after the transaction has occurred. See
generally Jeff Sovern, Good Will Adjustment Games: An Economic and Legal Analysis of
Secret Warranty Regulation, 60 MO. L. REV. 323 (1995). For a dramatic illustration of what
can happen when sellers can distinguish between buyers, see Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of
Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109
(1995), which states that car dealers charge different prices based on the race and gender of
purchasers.
114. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 93, at 671-72 ("T]here is no reason to expect an informed
minority to typify the demands of the other consumers.... [The minority could seek] a different
warranty[,] ... a different forum selection clause, or even [that] the product ... be colored
avocado green.").
115. Several commentators have observed that these searches are quite rare:
[There is no evidence that a small cadre of type-A consumers ferrets out the
most beneficial subordinate contract terms, permitting the market to protect the
vast majority of consumers.... It is hard ... to imagine a sufficient number of
prospective consumers refusing to rent a car because the contract contains an
unfair forum selection clause.
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likely to be of interest to consumers, but the cost of learning about
them and comparing them is also likely to be greater than would be
true of, for example, a price term."6 For example, few consumers
are likely to understand the drawbacks of binding arbitration.17 If
too few consumers search for firms that do not require binding
arbitration, then Schwartz and Wilde's searchers will not protect
the nonsearchers." 8
Meyerson, supra note 45, at 1270-71.
[Schwartz and Wilde's] assumptions are unrealistic. Although it may be true
that there are some markets at some times and places where sellers have
generally changed their forms to please the relatively few informed and powerful
buyers, Schwartz and Wilde offer no evidence to support their conclusion that
such markets are typical.
Slawson, supra note 80, at 43. See also Cruz & Hinck, supra note 93, at 664 ("Mhe existence
of any sizable informed minority is highly doubtful."); Sternlight, supra note 45, at 691 ("[With
regard to arbitration] it seems likely that the knowledgeable minority' is an extremely small
minority.... If the knowledgeable minority is sufficiently small, the supplier may well make
enough money from taking advantage of the majority to more than justify losing the
minority's business."); cf id. at 688 ("[Ilt seems generally true that while consumers may be
well informed about certain key contractual terms, such as price or color or engine size, they
generally know very little about the subordinate contract terms ..... ).
116. Goldberg, supra note 41, at 485. Michael I. Meyerson has elaborated on this point:
Subordinate terms will not be known because the cost of acquiring the necessary
information exceeds the expected gain to the consumer from that information.
The first cost of acquiring information concerning contract terms is the time the
consumer must spend reading the document.... Some sellers attempt to increase
this cost through the use of fine print or obscure placement.... The cost to the
consumer is made all the more excessive by the high cost of understanding a
term's legal significance. Again, some sellers try to increase this cost by hiding
the term's meaning in obscure "legalese".... [C]ostly research is generally
required to understand the legal effect of a particular term. Obviously,
consumers will not be able to undertake such research for every form they sign.
Meyerson, supra note 46, at 597-98 (footnotes omitted). See also Cruz & Hinck, supra note 93,
at 675-76 ("[It is seldom the case that there will be many consumers for whom the cost of
becoming informed is less than the expected loss from the inefficient terms."); Goldman, supra
note 47, at 719. Sometimes, as discussed above, firms use inflated transaction costs to make
it more difficult to ascertain the features of such terms. See supra notes 45-56 and
accompanying text.
117. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text
Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 309 (1986) ("The average consumer knows that he probably
will be unable to fully understand the dense text of a form contract .... "); Hillman &
Rachlinski, supra note 80, at 436 ("[The consumer would not understand much of the
language of the boilerplate even if she took the time to read it.").
118. Cf Korobkin, supra note 90, at 1240 ("The types of terms that generally appear in
form contracts suggest that the negative reputational consequences of inefficient non-salient
form terms are unlikely to discipline sellers to offer efficient terms.").
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Similarly, scholars have suggested that consumers might
justifiably assume that few consumers will bother to read the
terms, and therefore sellers, knowing this, will draft terms that
are unfavorable to consumers. Accordingly, consumers can skip
the dreary task of reading the terms because they can already
anticipate the worst." 9 Consumers may also forego reading
contracts because they believe that other firms will not offer better
terms, 2 ° a belief that may be correct.' 2 ' Even if other firms do offer
better terms, consumers will not search for those better terms if
they do not anticipate that the terms will be better, especially given
the cost of searching for and reading competitors' contracts. 122 In
addition, as R. Ted Cruz and Jeffrey Hinck have written, "there is
a very strong incentive for buyers to free ride on the information of
others, and if everybody free rides, no informed minority will ever
form." 23 In any event, it is quite clear that many consumers do not
119. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 93, at 668; Katz, supra note 80, at 282-90.
120. See Goldman, supra note 47, at 718; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 80, at 436,446-
47.
121. Slawson, supra note 41, at 531. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585
(1991), discussed infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text, is instructive. The case involved
the enforceability of a forum selection clause in a cruise line passenger ticket. The
International Committee of Passenger Lines, a trade association of sixteen passenger cruise
lines operating eighty-one vessels, filed an amicus brief describing the use of such forum
selection clauses as a "universal practice" in passenger ticket contracts; all sixteen members
of the association used them. Brief of The Intl Comm. of Passenger Lines as Amicus Curiae
Supporting the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S.
585 (1991) (No. 89-1647), 1990 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 392.
122. Meyerson, supra note 46, at 599-600 (noting the high transaction costs of finding a
seller offering the preferred term).
123. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 93, at 676.
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read through boilerplate agreements" u and that not doing so may
be rational utility-maximizing behavior.'25
Consequently, as to un-searched-for attributes, the market can
still be monopolistic. In Schwartz and Wilde's view,
[a] market can be considered monopolistic for any term used by
all or almost all firms if: (1) the market is not price competitive;
and (2) the term at issue appears in arcane legal language and
fine or otherwise inconspicuous print .... [Or, if] the market is
124. See Mayer, supra note 48.
[Riegulators say ... many consumers agree to mandatory arbitration without
knowing it. The clauses may be buried in a pile of documents a consumer is
asked to sign quickly, such as during a real estate settlement; tacked onto the
back of a sales receipt; or, in the case of some Internet retailers, placed at the
bottom of a special World Wide Web page that specifies the terms and conditions
of each sale.
Id.; see also Burke, supra note 87, at 299 ("Courts know that parties sign or manifest assent
to standard form contracts that they have not read, understood or negotiated."); Meyerson,
supra note 45, at 1269 ("It is no secret that consumers neither read nor understand standard
form contracts."); The Arbitration Trap: How Consumers Pay for 'Low Cost'Justice, CONSUMER
REP., Aug. 1999, at 64 ("Many consumers aren't aware their transaction includes an
arbitration clause .... "). Other proof is anecdotal. Federal law required a bank to notify its
customers of certain rights. The bank puckishly mailed to a hundred of its customers a
pamphlet in which it offered to send ten dollars to anyone who replied by sending to the bank
their name and address on a piece of paper with the word "regulation" written on it. No one
did so. See ALAN SCHWARTz & ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1142 (2d ed. 1991); Jeff Sovern, Letter to the Editor, Banks Are Too Sly on Risks of
Debit Cards, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1997, at A22.
125. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 627, 631
(2002); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 80, at 436; Katz, supra note 80, at 273; see also
Trebilcock & Dewees, supra note 111, at 115 ("[Mlany consumers probably rely in part on the
constraints (real or illusory) imposed by other consumers at the margin (i.e., they let the
market shop for them). In addition, reading complicated forms in detail denies the principal
virtue of standard form contracts-reduced transaction costs."); Eisenberg, supra note 117,
at 305 ("[Clonsumers who are faced with ... form contracts ... refus[e] to read, and ... it is
reasonable for them to do so."); Goldman, supra note 47, at 717 ("[Plurchasers would be acting
irrationally if they incurred the costs required to fully comprehend all contract terms.");
Rakoff, supra note 47, at 1226 ("IThe near-universal failure of adherents to read and
understand the documents they sign cannot be dismissed as mere laziness."); Schwartz &
Wilde, supra note 80, at 1460 ("Whether a consumer reads a particular contract may depend
on whether the consumer perceives the expected gain from reading to exceed the cost.");
Sternlight, supra note 45, at 689 (arguing that reading the fine print would sometimes not be
enough because a consumer would need legal advice to assist her in understanding its
significance). As discussed infra note 179 and accompanying text, the law has responded to
the practice by requiring certain information to appear conspicuously. Consumers may thus
assume that any information of genuine value will not be in small print, and so reading the
fine print is a waste of time.
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price competitive... a monopolistic outcome for any term should
be presumed to occur if a substantial portion ... of the compari-
son shoppers are not term conscious.
126
As Victor Goldberg has written, "[ulnless the firm intentionally
makes the particular term an important selling point-as is
sometimes the case with the length or inclusiveness of the
warranty-few, if any, customers will perceive the existence of
variations in terms."27
When consumers are not aware of or do not appreciate the
ramifications of a term or practice, the firm has license to use that
term or practice to inflate consumer transaction costs. 128 W. David
Slawson has explained, "[an unfair form will not deter sales
because the seller can easily arrange his sales so that few if any
buyers will read his forms, whatever their terms, and he risks
nothing because the law will treat his forms as contracts anyway."29
If the market cannot function, firms can behave monopolistically i s
126. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 97, at 661 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 660
("Evaluating terms is more costly than evaluating prices...."). Mandatory arbitration clauses
may be an example of a term that is universally used, or nearly so, in some markets. See
Mayer, supra note 48 (discussing credit card companies' use of arbitration). Some have argued
that even consumers who do not read the fine print can nevertheless exercise control over
firms' behavior through their expectations. If the product and firm do not meet consumer
expectations, regardless of what the contract provides, consumers can punish firms by
withholding business and urging other consumers to shop elsewhere. If enough consumers
react this way, firms may have to fulfill consumer expectations even though they have no
contractual obligation to do so. See Trebilcock & Dewees, supra note 111, at 105. Although
this phenomenon happens often enough in the automobile market to have earned a
name-good will adjustments-and to be regulated in some states, see generally Sovern, supra
note 113, it probably does not happen often enough in most markets to offset the losses to
consumers caused by inflation of transaction costs.
127. Goldberg, supra note 41, at 485.
128. Cf Purcell, supra note 46, at 494 ("The fact that specific provisions happen to appear
in the contracts, after all, is the result of nothing necessarily other than consumer ignorance
and the common interests of the companies."); Sternlight, supra note 45, at 688-89 ("If the
consumer is not aware of the existence or significance of [a] clause, the supplier is free to
impose a term that benefits the supplier but significantly harms the consumer.").
129. Slawson, supra note 41, at 531; see also Meyerson, supra note 46, at 595 ("[Ilnefficient
transactions occur because consumers do not read form contracts, or do not understand the
terms, and are thus unaware of their contents. Moreover, the businesses that draft these
contracts do so knowing that they will not be read by the typical consumer.").
130. See Rakoff, supra note 47, at 1231 ("Because customers generally neither are expected
to nor do read, understand, or shop the form terms, market behavior gives no clue to their
preferences.").
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This circumstance is thus a variation of George A. Akerlofs
famous lemons model.'3 ' Firms compete to offer terms and features
that consumers pay attention to while having their way with terms
that consumers either do not pay attention to or do not understand.
Victor Goldberg gives the example of a competitive insurance
industry without any governmental intervention:
Firms in the industry compete by lowering their price and then
compensate for this by decreasing the coverage (in as hidden a
way as possible) with other firms being forced to cut also in order
to remain competitive. A sort of "Gresham's Law" of bad policies
driving out good would ensue.'32
The italicized phrase of course brings to mind the deliberate
inflation of transaction costs.
Once a firm has the power to behave monopolistically in some
respects, it can use inflated transaction costs to avoid the very
competition that might make it harder to inflate still other costs, as
alluded to above. 33 For example, when firms delay the disclosure
of their terms, as in Brower, they increase the cost to consumers
of finding out those terms, thus rendering their markets less
competitive. The practice of delaying disclosure of terms may
explain the failure of many software sellers to give warranties.3
By making it harder for consumers to discover the absence of a
warranty, sellers avoid the need to compete to offer one. Though the
reasoning may sound circular-firms inflate transaction costs so
they can disrupt the functioning of markets, and they use the
resulting impaired markets to inflate transaction costs-it is not.
The process starts with a defect in the market, perhaps consumer
ignorance, as in the case of the rebates, and builds from there.
Arguably, if consumers do not pay attention to or abandon efforts
to protect their interests merely because doing so would require
reading small print or writing a letter, the particular interests must
131. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemon'. • Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 48 (1970).
132. Goldberg, supra note 41, at 486 (emphasis added). Other forces might ameliorate the
problem, such as advertising or private producers of information, though "there is no reason
to believe that the market will negate the standard form contract problem." Id.
133. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
134. Braucher, supra note 41, at 1813.
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not matter much to them, and therefore are not worth attending
to.135 But that argument is flawed. It fails to take into account how
consumers actually behave and the internalities alluded to above. 136
E. Scott Maynes has written about how "consumers [often] cannot
find the time to manage effectively consumption that has grown
more complex and dynamic."'37 That is because many consumers
subordinate their interests as consumers to their interests in their
jobs138 and because consumers must spread their attention "thinly
across thousands of transactions and the management of hundreds
of possessions.' 39
D. More on Internalities
Consumers respond predictably to certain stimuli, and companies
can take advantage of this behavior. Some internalities have
already been discussed, 4" but others exist. For example, the famous
tendency of people to procrastinate probably leads many consumers
to put off seeking rebates until finally they abandon the effort
altogether.' 4' Firms aware of this when choosing between a rebate
135. Cf Note, Efficiency and a Rule of"Free Contract": A Critique of Two Models of Law
and Economics, 97 HARV. L. REV. 978, 993 (1984) ("The consumer who, by reason or
obliviousness, fails to search for the discount price is less likely to merit our solicitude .... ").
136. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
137. E. Scott Maynes, Consumer Problems in Market Economies, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
CONSUMER MOVEMENT 158, 163 (Stephen Brobeck ed., 1997).
138. Id. at 158.
139. Id. at 158-59; see also Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive
Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1216 (1994) ("Once it is recognized that decisionmaking
capacities are limited and that people have many competing demands made on their time and
attention, the failure of consumers to read some product warnings becomes foreseeable and
inevitable.").
140. See supra notes 57-89, 116-24 and accompanying text.
141. Cf. Camerer et al., supra note 57, at 1225 (suggesting that one source for "status quo
bias" is "procrastination-the tendency to repeatedly delay taking beneficial actions based on
a mistaken belief that one will take them in the future"); Ted O'Donoghue & Mathew Rabin,
Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 103 (1999) (explaining that people have
present-biased preferences); Brian Bergman, Guilt-Free Goofing Off, MACLEAN'S, July 28,
2003, at 38 (reporting that sixty percent of survey respondents describe themselves as modest
procrastinators and ninety-five percent of respondents say they procrastinate at least
occasionally, and quoting Professor Piers Steel as saying that "[pirocrastination is our normal
state of being"); Barbara Yost, Don't Delay To Read Why We Procrastinate, SEATTLE TIMES,
May 2, 2004, at M2 (reporting that psychologist William Knaus estimates that "20% of the
population are inveterate procrastinators").
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offer and a lower price may choose the rebate precisely to take
account of this behavior.
Similarly, whether or not it is rational for consumers to forego
reading fine print, 142 it appears that a number of consumer
characteristics operate to reduce the desire of consumers to read
fine print. One characteristic is the tendency of consumers to focus
on what social scientists label "vivid" information, that is, more
interesting and exciting information, rather than dull informa-
tion.143 Bills identifying what a consumer owes and circulars such as
pay-per-view listings with colorful photographs are more likely to
draw consumer attention than are bill-stuffers printed in legalistic
language.'"
Another reason consumers may not bother to read terms is
that many contract clauses address problems that may arise in
connection with contract performance, problems that afflict
relatively few consumers. A considerable body of evidence suggests
that consumers tend to be optimistic145 and so may not expect to be
142. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
143. See RICHARD NISBEIT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 45 (1980) (explaining that people process and remember
vivid information more than pallid information); Jonathan Shedler & Melvin Manis, Can the
Availability Heuristic Explain Vividness Effects? 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 26, 35
(1986) (finding that vividness is correlated with recollection of facts); Marie G. Wilson,
Gregory B. Northcroft & Margaret A. Neale, Information Competition and Vividness Effects
in On-Line Judgments, 44 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 132,137-38
(1989) (finding that jurors were more likely to use vivid information in making their
decisions).
144. Researchers have also found that many consumers give more attention to pictures
than text. See NISBETr & ROSS, supra note 143, at 51 (listing studies); Robert E. Gehring,
Michael P. Toglia & Gregory K. Kimble, Recognition Memory for Words and Pictures at Short
and Long Retention Intervals, 4 MEMORY & COGNITION 256, 256, 260 (1976) (finding that
recollection is better for pictures); Roger N. Shepard, Recognition Memory for Words,
Sentences, and Pictures, 6 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 156, 158-60 (1967) (finding
that color in pictures aids in recollection).
145. See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of
Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
334, 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) ("One of the most robust findings in the
psychology of prediction is that people's predictions tend to be optimistically biased."); Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1782 (2000)
(stating that contracting parties tend to be "unrealistically optimistic"); Christine Jolls,
Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659
(1998) ("[Pleople are often unrealistically optimistic about the probability that bad things will
happen to them. A vast number of studies support this conclusion."); Neil D. Weinstein,
Unrealistic Optimisirn About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806,
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affected by such terms. For example, consumers may not pay
attention to terms governing disputes because they may not
anticipate a dispute.'46 Similarly, consumers may not trouble
themselves about default terms 47 because psychological studies
suggest that consumers underestimate the likelihood that they
will default.'
806, 818-19 (1980); see also Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the
Determinants of Confidence, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT, supra, at 230,248 ("Although overconfidence is not universal, it is prevalent, often
massive, and difficult to eliminate...."); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 80, at 454 ("People
intending to purchase a product likely will overstate their own ability to assess the reputation
and good faith of the person or company with whom they are interacting."); Dan N. Stone,
Overconfidence in Initial Self-Efficacy Judgments: Effects on Decision Processes and
Performance, 59 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 452, 453-54, 468
(1994) (citing studies that demonstrate consumer optimism). For examples of optimistic
behavior, see Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CH. L. REV. 751, 772-74 (2003)
(reviewing THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT (2002)) ("With respect to most of the risks of life, people appear to be
unrealistically optimistic."). For a warning against oversimplifying reports of research on
topics such as consumer optimism and against generalizing too widely from such research,
see Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for
Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 125 (2002); see also
Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the
New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1911-12 (2002) (arguing that
legal writers often misinterpret behavioral research). That warning seems less apropos here
because the available studies offer significant support for the notion that people will be overly
optimistic about the likelihood that they will breach contracts. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra, at
1783-86 (giving examples of consumers underestimating risk). On the other hand, some
evidence suggests that in some cases, people exaggerate the probability of risks. See Korobkin,
supra note 90, at 1232-33 (stating that people exaggerate risks that are familiar and easy to
imagine).
146. See Braucher, supra note 41, at 1813-14 ("Shopping is often much less common when
it comes to contingent terms such as warranties, remedies, dispute forum, or other terms that
only matter if something goes wrong with a purchase and that are therefore secondary
concerns to consumers. Use of legalese adds to the problem ....").
147. See Jean Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the
Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 363 (1988) ("Debtors in general do not expect
to default and avoid thinking about this risk.").
148. Eisenberg, supra note 145, at 1784 ("The availability heuristic may lead a contracting
party to give undue weight to his present intention to perform, which is vivid and concrete,
as compared with the abstract possibility that future circumstances may compel him to
breach."); Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and
Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 149 (1998) ("Experiment has shown that we are an
optimistic lot, consistently underestimating risks and overestimating advantages."); Robert
A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of
Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 723-24 (2000) ("[Pleople generally have an
inflated view of their own capabilities and therefore downplay risks they believe they can
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Excessively optimistic consumers may make poor decisions.
Schwartz and Wilde have suggested that "[miarkets may correct
poorly for consumer optimism."'49 In the context of warranties, they
explained the consequences of consumer optimism: "If ... optimism
causes ... consumers not to demand [warranties], warranties will
probably not appear. Firms lack an incentive to offer broader
warranties than consumers demand because warranties are costly
.... 150 Thus, firms may choose not to compete on the basis that they
will absorb a risk because they can expect that consumers will
assume that the risky event will not in fact occur. Consequently,
firms have nothing to lose by inserting terms that impose risks on
consumers.' 51 The result, again, is a by-product of market failure.
Consumers also suffer from information overload, the tendency to
disregard relevant information when too much is provided.'52 Too
control."); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091-93 (2000);
Rachlinski, supra note 54, at 1179. Russell Korobkin has suggested that the explanation for
this phenomenon lies in the availability heuristic under which consumers take into account
risks that they know of or can readily imagine but disregard risks with which they are less
familiar. Korobkin, supra note 90, at 1232-33. He explains:
[]f a low-probability risk comes to pass: if the seller's product does not function;
if the buyer does not pay on time; if the parties become embroiled in a dispute
that leads to litigation .... If these possible but unlikely outcomes are not readily
.available" to buyers, they are likely to respond to the risk of these harms by
treating them as if they do not exist at all.
Id. at 1233.
149. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 80, at 1429. Schwartz and Wilde concluded-based on
information available at the time they wrote-that no reason existed to assume that
consumers will be systematically optimistic, id. at 1435-36, but later studies have called this
conclusion into question, see supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
150. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 80, at 1429.
151. Firms face a different situation from consumers. As Edward A. Purcell, Jr., has
explained:
Because the companies deal with millions of consumers they have the economic
incentives to gain whatever information seems useful, and they know that over
the aggregate of their consumer sales they will derive substantial benefits from
various advantageous and arcane contractual provisions that they incorporate,
even though such provisions will become useful in only a small percentage of
their total transactions.
Purcell, supra note 46, at 487.
152. See, e.g., John C. Bergstrom & John R. Stoll,An Analysis ofInformation Overload with
Implications for Survey Design Research, 12 LEISURE SCI. 265, 278 (1990) (finding that the
quantity and complexity of information can obscure decision making); Kevin Lane Keller &
Richard Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision Effectiveness, 14
J. CONSUMER RES. 200, 211-12 (1987); Naresh K Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer
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much information appears to cause many consumers to adopt
strategies to reduce the amount of information to a more manage-
able amount when making decisions.' Consequently, many
consumers undoubtedly "manage away" the small print.'
Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 419, 427-28 (1982) (listing studies). Early studies
included Jacob Jacoby, Donald E. Speller & Carol A. Kohn, Brand Choice Behavior as a
Function of Information Load: Replication and Extension, 1 J. CONSUMER RES. 33, 40-41
(1974) (finding that consumers made poorer decisions with more information); Jacob Jacoby,
Donald E. Speller & Carol Kohn Berning, Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information
Load, 11 J. MARKETING RES. 63, 67 (1974) (same). For criticism of the early Jacoby studies,
see, for example, Naresh K Malhotra, Reflections of the Information Overload Paradigm in
Consumer Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436, 436-37 (1984) (suggesting that
information overload does occur, but that the early Jacoby studies did not demonstrate it); J.
Edward Russo, More Information Is Better: A Reevaluation of Jacoby, Speller and Kohn, 1 J.
CONSUMER RES. 68, 71-72 (1974) (claiming that Jacoby used the incorrect measure of
information); John 0. Summers, Less Information Is Better?, 11 J. MARKETING RES. 467,467
(1974) (criticizing Jacoby's methods); William L. Wilkie, Analysis of Effects of Information
Load, 11 J. MARKETING RES. 462, 465-66 (1974) (criticizing Jacoby for combining brands and
items in defining information). For Jacoby's replies, see Jacob Jacoby, Donald E. Speller &
Carol A.X Berning, Constructive Criticism and Programmatic Research: Reply to Russo, 2 J.
CONSUMER RES. 154 (1975); Jacob Jacoby, Information Load and Decision Quality: Some
Contested Issues, 14 J. MARKETING RES. 569 (1977) (agreeing and disagreeing with critics of
his research). For studies rebutting the information overload effect, see Naresh K Malhotra,
Arun K Jain & Stephen W. Lagakos, The Information Overload Controversy: An Alternative
Viewpoint, 46 J. MARKETING 27, 34-36 (1982) (finding that consumers made better choices
with more information); Thomas E. Muller, Buyer Response to Variations in Product
Information Load, 69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 300, 304 (1984) (finding that consumers used the
extra information given them); Debra L. Scammon, "Information Load" and Consumers, 4 J.
CONSUMER RES. 148, 148-49, 153-54 (1977) (finding that length of exposure was more
important than amount of information). For criticism of these last studies, see Jacob Jacoby,
Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 432, 432-34 (1984) (suggesting
that the studies cited supra do not really disprove information overload). For criticism of the
Keller & Staelin study cited supra, see Robert J. Meyer & Eric J. Johnson, Information
Overload and the Nonrobustness of Linear Models: A Comment on Keller & Staelin, 15 J.
CONSUMER RES. 498 (1989). Keller and Staelin's response appears in Kevin Lane Keller &
Richard Staelin, Assessing Biases in Measuring Decision Effectiveness and Information
Overload, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 504 (1989). For law review discussions of information
overload, see David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of
Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986)
(suggesting that information overload does not exist). But see Eisenberg, supra note 117
(arguing that refusing to read dense contracts is reasonable); Robert E. Scott, Error and
Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive
Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 329-31, 361-62 (1986)
(expanding on the Grether analysis).
153. See Korobkin, supra note 90, at 1226-29.
154. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 80, at 450-52 ("Some scholars have argued that
this tendency to simplify decisionmaking means that people essentially cannot evaluate the
many situations covered by the terms in standard-form contracts.").
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E. Other Reasons Why Firms Might Not Compete To Reduce
Transaction Costs
Another reason competitive markets do not supply reduced
transaction costs is that some businesses may choose not to compete
in a particular way for fear that their advertising would not be
effective, would be costly, or might obscure other messages they
would rather convey. 5 In theory, firms should advertise terms that
are more favorable to consumers if the profits from increased sales
generated by those terms exceed the cost of the advertising together
with the lost profits from eschewing terms that are less favorable to
consumers.'56 But this equation seldom leads to the advertising and
adoption of terms that consumers would prefer.'57 To understand
why, imagine a business that competes on the ground that it does
not insist on binding arbitration in a distant forum. What seller
would want to call attention to the fact that it ends up in disputes
with its customers?' Even if such advertising increased the seller's
market share, it would probably reduce sales of the generic product,
155. See Korobkin, supra note 90, at 1242-43.
[Sluch marketing efforts will be costly, so sellers will have to balance the
benefits of exploiting their competitive advantage against the cost of making the
market responsive to it.... [Iun a complex world in which products have many
attributes, it seems likely that a seller could fail to make certain attributes
salient no matter how many resources it expends on advertising ....
Id.
156. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 93, at 658-59.
157. Id. at 660 ("Most contract terms likely provide less benefit to consumers than the cost
of providing them plus the cost of advertising them."). But see Goldman, supra note 47, at 716
("If a seller includes unwanted terms in its contracts, a business offering the preferred higher
price/easier terms option should inform consumers that although the competitor's price is
lower, the real value that the competitor offers is less.").
158. See Sternlight, supra note 45, at 692.
[Rlealistically, no seller is likely to call attention to possible problems with its
own product by telling consumers that "if it explodes you can sue us in court, not
just through an arbitration." In other words, by publicizing the risks relevant to
the arbitration clause the seller might well cause sales as a whole to plummet.
Id.; see also Goldman, supra note 47, at 719 (explaining that firms do not want to call
attention to negative potential outcomes); Korobkin, supra note 90, at 1242 ("[A firm with an
in-house legal department that gives it a cost advantage in litigating rather than arbitrating
disputes with its customers is not likely to launch an advertising campaign bragging that 'you
can sue us in court at any time without limitations.'); Meyerson, supra note 46, at 602 ("Since
consumers are, at best, only dimly aware of [contract clauses allocating risks to them], sellers
will not want to call attention to the risks for fear of creating a disincentive for any purchase
at all.").
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including that seller's sales.159 Nor is a seller likely to undertake the
considerable burden of educating consumers on the drawbacks of
binding arbitration. Such a seller might also fear that it would not
recoup the benefits of its advertising campaign because those
benefits would also flow to free riders.16 ° A business would probably
do better to add a binding arbitration term to its own contracts and
compete on the basis of a more readily understandable term, like
price. 16' The result, as Todd D. Rakoff has written, "is that over time
more and more risks are shifted to the [consumer] .162
For another example, suppose company A offers its product at
price P, with rebate R. The average net retail price for A's product
will be between P and P-R because many consumers will not seek
the rebate. Suppose a competitor, B, also wishes to offer its product
at an average price between price P and P-R, but rather than using
a rebate scheme, B simply wants to sell its product at a standard
price. B could run an advertisement that says something like "You
know you won't redeem the rebate coupon, so you won't get the
benefit of the rebate. Buy our product and you won't have to pay the
higher price you'll end up paying for A's product or deal with the
rebate coupon." Such an advertisement might end up doing more for
A than B among consumers who erroneously believe they will
respond to a rebate offer; in addition, some of the benefits might
again flow to free riders. The advertisement might also distract from
159. Cf Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response
to Market Manipulation, 6 RoGER WIUIAMS U. L. REv. 259, 336-37 (2000) (arguing that
marketing products by increasing consumer perceptions of the product's riskiness is likely to
produce such effects).
160. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 93, at 659; Goldman, supra note 47, at 719.
161. Cf Goldman, supra note 47, at 719 (explaining that firms do not want to waste their
advertising budget by focusing on insignificant terms); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 80,
at 452 ("This narrow cognitive focus that people bring to complex decisions creates a
temptation for businesses to offer enticing prices and terms concerning the negotiable portions
of the form and to make up for any concessions by drafting one-sided boilerplate terms.");
Korobkin, supra note 90, at 1206 ("[Mlarket competition actually will force sellers to provide
low-quality non-salient attributes in order to save costs that will be passed along to buyers
in the form of lower prices."); Meyerson, supra note 46, at 602 ("[Slellers will not want to
divert their limited advertising budgets to publicizing factors that will play at most a minimal
role in purchasing decisions."); Sternlight, supra note 45, at 692 ("[Slellers may be reluctant
to expend a significant portion of their advertising budget on subordinate terms when they
could likely achieve greater inroads by focusing on terms more likely to influence consumer
choice.").
162. Rakoff, supra note 47, at 1227.
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other messages B would prefer to convey. Consequently, B might
choose to compete on a different basis. And, indeed, such advertising
is unheard of. "
Still another reason why markets break down in this context is
that some companies may be subject to a form of inertia and would
rather not change their practices just to compete on a basis that
may not increase sales. This is especially likely because a firm that
chooses to compete on the basis of lowering transaction costs must
forego the income generated by inflated transaction costs-and so
competition on this basis is not costless. Put another way, firms
may increase their sales to consumers by not inflating consumer
transaction costs, but doing so may reduce their profits by
decreasing other revenue. Thus, firms competing on the basis of
reduced transaction costs are taking a risk that the increase in
business will not offset the loss of profits. For example, imagine a
firm that sells products to consumers and sells to others informa-
tion about the consumers who buy their products. A business that
chooses to compete on the basis that it makes it easy for consumers
to opt out of the sale of their personal information runs the risk of
not attracting enough customers to offset the losses from the sale
of consumer information. Firms may not be willing to take that
chance.
In sum, notwithstanding conventional economic theory, in many
instances markets fail to produce competition to reduce consumer
transaction costs. Though this phenomenon is due in part to
consumer internalities, firms seem willing to take advantage of and
profit from these internalities and so should not be excused from
responsibility on that basis.
The reader should be cautioned that this list of conditions in
which firms inflate consumer transaction costs may not be complete.
It is at best a preliminary attempt to explore a complicated
phenomenon.
163. Cf. Goldman, supra note 47, at 718 ("[Clompetitors generally are reluctant to engage
in negative comparative advertising. Emphasizing a competitor's harsh contract terms risks
the possibility of negative counter-advertising, the sole effect of which may be reduced sales
industry-wide.").
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III. WHY INFLATING CONSUMER TRANSACTION COSTS IS
OBJECTIONABLE
Explaining why inflated transaction costs are objectionable
almost seems unnecessary. Transaction costs have been referred to
as "the root of all evil,"' the cause of "monopolistic inefficiencies,"6 5
"dead weight losses that reduce efficiency," 166 and the source of
all externalities."' Leading scholars have suggested that legal
rules should be fashioned to minimize transactions costs. 168 The
importance of transaction costs cannot be underestimated: they
have been described as central to the study of economics 169 and
held responsible both for the existence of firms' ° and how the
164. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 142 (1979). But see
Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 30, at 3 (arguing that transaction costs are sometimes necessary
but acknowledging that "some transactions costs might prove wasteful and deserve
elimination").
165. Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 61 (1968) (discussing
negotiation costs).
166. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 26-27 (2002).
167. See Steven G. Medema & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Educating Alice: Lessons from the
Coase Theorem, in 19 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 69, 73 (Richard 0. Zerbe Jr. &
William Kovacic eds., 2000); Zerbe & McCurdy, supra note 30, at 562 ("[E]xternalities come
into being because the transaction costs of resolving them are too high. In this sense, every
story about externalities is also a story about transaction costs."); see also Fred S. McChesney,
What'd I Say?: Coase, Demsetz and the Unending Externality Debate 3-4 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of
Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 04-01), available at
http'J/papers.ssrn.com/abstract=491182 ("Low transaction costs allow internalization of social
costs, and so reduce the incidence of externalities; as those costs rise, so does the extent of
externalities.... In the limit, if there were no transaction costs, there seemingly would be no
social costs."). But see Harold Demsetz, Ownership and the Externality Problem, in PROPERTY
RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 282,284 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney
eds., 2003) (arguing that, even in a world of zero transaction costs, externalities would still
exist).
168. POSNER, supra note 94, at 427-28; R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 19 (1960); Cooter, supra note 27, at 14 (Tlhe structure of law should be chosen so
that transaction costs are minimized, because this will conserve resources used up by the
bargaining process and also promote efficient outcomes in the bargaining itself."); see also
AVINASH K DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY: A TRANSACTION-COST PERSPECTIVE 61
(1996) ("There is clear potential benefit from economizing on transaction costs."); Medema &
Zerbe, supra note 167, at 83 (discussing transaction costs involved in cattle trespass in
California); Veljanovski, supra note 30, at 67-68; Mark Wohar, Alternative Versions of the
Coase Theorem and the Definition of Transaction Costs, 27 Q.J. BUS. & ECON. 3, 13 (1988)
(summarizing different definitions of the economic goal of the law in the literature).
169. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 233 (1979).
170. Ronald H. Coase argued in his famous article The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA
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organizational arrangements that govern trade in a market
economy are established. 171 Nevertheless, offering some reasons why
inflated transaction costs are troublesome seems desirable. In a
nutshell, inflated transaction costs are objectionable because they
typically waste resources or generate inefficiencies in the sense of
misallocating resources or both.
Rebates illustrate both problems. Consumers who intend to seek
the rebate but never bother, or fail in the attempt because they do
not comply with arcane requirements, experience a distortion of
their demand function. 172 Figure 1 displays the familiar model of
supply and demand in which firms face a downward-sloping demand
curve D'D: as prices decline, quantity demanded increases. The
supply curve S'S slopes upward because as prices increase, sellers
are willing to supply more goods. In the absence of rebates, the
equilibrium price is determined by the intersection of the demand
curve D'D with the supply curve S'S, which results in the selling of
Q0 goods at price P0. The consumer surplus-the benefit the
consumer receives from the purchase-for a consumer purchasing
at the equilibrium price is represented in Figure 1 by triangle HBE.
When a seller offers a rebate, however, consumers who intend to
seek the rebate believe that the price has been reduced to Pl;
consequently, consumers are now willing to purchase quantity Q, of
the goods because they expect to receive the larger consumer
surplus depicted by triangle ABC. But when consumers fail to
obtain the rebate, consumers still receive only the lesser surplus
represented by triangle HBE. Indeed, even that surplus is eroded (in
a way not depicted in Figure 1) because it comes at unnecessary
expense: consumers have purchased Q, of the goods rather than the
lesser quantity Q0 at which they could have had the same surplus.
Presumably the erosion, however, is partly offset by the ownership
of additional units of the good. The rebate thus deceives consumers
into inefficiently purchasing more goods than they would want if
386 (1937), that firms are established because of transaction costs. In the absence of
transaction costs, the market would be the most efficient way to buy and sell services, and so
there would be no need for people to affiliate with firms. Id. at 390. The presence of
transaction costs, however, sufficiently increases the cost of buying goods and services in
markets such that it is cheaper to form firms. Id. at 390-93.
171. Paul L. Joskow, Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 95, 96 (2002).
172. See Figure 1.
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they better understood the transaction costs incurred in obtaining
rebates.
D' B
QO
Quantity
Figure 1
Even consumers who obtain the rebate incur transaction costs
that do not benefit society because they must comply with the
requirements for the rebate. If the seller simply offered the product
at a reduced price, consumers would not have had to fulfill any
requirements to obtain the reduced price. Accordingly, the rebate
comes at a dearer price than necessary. Many of these costs, such as
the requirement that the consumer make up words from the phrase
"prescription strength" or boil labels in order to remove them, do not
benefit the manufacturer offering the rebate, and so these costs are
a deadweight loss to society.'73
This deadweight loss to society comes up repeatedly when
consumers are willing to incur the transaction costs necessary to
protect their interests. Consumers also incur these costs when they,
for example, write letters to protect their privacy or return a
173. Only consumers who purchase the item never intending to seek the rebate--that is,
consumers who are willing to pay the higher price-suffer no losses because of the rebate
offer.
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computer because of objectionable contract terms that were not
disclosed prior to shipment. Firms may not mind this because their
revenue from the transaction remains the same as if they had not
inflated the consumer's transaction costs. But the surplus from the
exchange is reduced because consumers are diverted from other
activities.
Other methods of increasing consumer transaction costs also
generate these results. Several examples discussed above, such as
burying information in fine print, obscuring changes in contract
terms by enclosing them in a bill-stuffer, or sending contract terms
with the computer, result in consumers not having the information
they need to make informed decisions. As a result, consumers
again may act inconsistently with their preferences, producing an
inefficient equilibrium.
The practice is also problematic in a similar form of inflated
transaction costs noted above-the one exemplified by privacy opt
outs in which firms increase consumer transaction costs by making
it more difficult for consumers to communicate their preferences.
When businesses make it more expensive for consumers to express
their wishes but do not commensurately reduce their own costs, the
companies make it less likely that consumers will register their
desires, and the net benefits generated by the transaction are not
increased. Again, the company has increased its share of the total
economic surplus, but at the expense of reducing the overall size of
that surplus.
Though transaction costs are generally to be minimized, they are
particularly troublesome in consumer transactions. Because the
stakes in consumer transactions normally are small, transaction
costs have a disproportionate capacity to deter consumers from
protecting their interests. Put another way, transaction costs are
likely to eat up much of the surplus from exchange in consumer
transactions given that that surplus is so small. Litigation provides
one clear example.174 Because the cost of litigation often exceeds the
value of consumer claims, many suits cannot be justified on
economic grounds.' v
174. Recall that this Article defines transaction costs broadly enough to include litigation
costs. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
175. See Alon Klement, Threats To Sue and Cost Divisibility Under Asymmetric
Information, 23 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 261,261 (2003) ("[Mlost claimants choose not to pursue
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The Article has now demonstrated that firms inflate consumer
transaction costs and that such a practice is socially undesirable.
The Article will now explore how society has responded to this
phenomenon.
IV. CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW AND INCREASED CONSUMER
TRANSACTION COSTS
Though the law has not responded uniformly when firms
increase consumer transaction costs, legislatures and administra-
tive agencies, in particular, have often attempted to ban practices
that inflate consumer transaction costs on an ad hoc basis. From
these actions an underlying principle can be distilled that will
not surprise anyone: the law should restrain businesses from
inflating consumer transaction costs unnecessarily.'76 That princi-
ple, however, is seldom articulated in that way, and the failure to
make it an explicit norm has limited the power of courts to root
their decisions in such a rationale. Accordingly, courts have looked
to other norms on which to rest their rulings. These norms have
sometimes led courts to bar or regulate practices that inflate
consumer transaction costs, but not always. All in all, while it is
possible to infer that society seeks to bar inflated consumer
transaction costs, it is also clear that any such norm has not always
been recognized in that form.
their grievance in court, fearing the prospect of high litigation costs."); Jeff Sovern, Toward
a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes: Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law
and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 13,
85; David M. Trubeck, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel B.
Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 120 (1983) ("Our data do
suggest that the smaller the case, the less likely it is that litigation will 'pay.); Jonathan L.
Kempner, Note, The Home Owners Warranty Program: An Initial Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV.
357, 369 (1976) ("[Mlany claims are too small to be worth litigating."); Note, Minnesota
Statutory Warranties on New Homes-An Examination and Proposal, 64 MINN. L. REV. 413,
417 n. 19 (1980) (discussing the cost of litigating residential implied warranties); Muris, supra
note 28, at 12 ("[R]esort to courts for enforcement of consumer transactions is often
economically infeasible.").
176. Cf Charles H. Breeden & Peter G. Toumanoff, Transactions Costs and Economic
Institutions, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF F.A. HAYEK 161,
161, 168 (Kurt R. Leube & Albert H. Zlabinger eds., 1985) ("Much government activity can be
viewed as attempts to cope with the existence of transactions costs.").
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A. Legislation and Regulation
Legislatures have taken a number of steps to prevent the
inflation of consumer transaction costs. Many of these steps make
it easier for consumers to receive and understand information. For
example, the Truth in Lending Act standardized the quotation of
interest rates, finance charges, and other information so that
consumers can readily compare the price of credit and determine
which lender offers the best terms.'77 Similarly, some states require
consumer contracts to be written in plain English so that consumers
can more easily understand them.'78 Still other laws require certain
terms to be conspicuous so that consumers are more likely to
become aware of them. 7
9
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 8 ° and its implementing regulations
combine several of these ideas. The Act itself mandates that
disclosures to consumers be clear and conspicuous.' 8 ' The regula-
tions define that phrase as requiring that the notice be reasonably
understandable and designed to call attention to the nature and
significance of the information.'82 Those phrases are explained by
examples. Thus, the regulations state that something is designed to
call attention to the nature and significance of the information if it
uses a plain-language heading, a typeface and type size that are
easy to read, wide margins and ample line spacing, and boldface or
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000) (finance charges); id. § 1606 (interest rate); id. § 1637
(disclosures for open-end credit); id. § 1638 (disclosures for closed-end credit). As discussed
supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text, the ways in which interest rates were quoted before
enactment of this legislation made comparison difficult, if not impossible.
178. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-152 (West 2000) (stating that consumer
contracts "shall be written in plain language"); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (Consol. Supp.
2005) (stating that consumer contracts must be written "in a clear and coherent manner using
words with common and every day meanings"); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2205 (West Supp.
2005) (stating that consumer contracts "shall be ... easy to read and understand").
179. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2303 (2000) (stating that consumer product warranties must be
labeled conspicuously); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 335.1 (Consol. Supp. 2005) (stating that
liability of an automobile lessee for the total loss of a vehicle must be conspicuously disclosed);
U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2004) (stating that any disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability must be conspicuous).
180. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C. (2000)).
181. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(1)(A) (2000); 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(b) (2005).
182. 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(b)(1) (2005).
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italics for key words.' Writings qualify as reasonably understand-
able if written in short explanatory sentences and everyday words,
among other things.' The regulations thus seem designed to
minimize transaction costs so that consumers can make appropriate
choices. 85
Some rules reduce transaction costs by facilitating communica-
tions between consumers and firms. For example, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act 86 requires credit reporting agencies to make toll-free
numbers available to consumers for certain purposes.8 7 Similarly,
under the regulations implementing Gramm-Leach-Bliley, financial
institutions must make it easy for consumers to opt out of the
disclosure of their personal information, by, for example, providing
a form for the consumer to return, a toll-free number, or an e-mail
address for receipt of instructions. 8 The regulations expressly
provide that financial institutions may not require consumers to
draft their own letters to opt out. 8 9
As demonstrated by its regulations implementing the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has often
taken steps to reduce consumer transaction costs. Two more
examples illustrate this point: first, through a trade regulation rule,
the FTC requires gasoline stations to post octane ratings of gasoline,
thus making it easier for consumers to determine which type of
gas to buy;9 second, another FTC trade regulation rule obliges
183. Id. § 313.3(b)(2)(ii).
184. Id. § 313.3(b)(2)(i).
185. Unfortunately, this attempt appears not to have been entirely successful. See supra
note 104. If Congress wanted to give consumers the information they need to make an
informed choice, Congress should have given financial institutions an incentive to provide
consumers with that information by using an opt-in system. Sovern, supra note 28, at 1101-
03.
186. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2000)).
187. Credit reporting agencies that furnish consumer reports in connection with credit
transactions that the consumer does not initiate must maintain a toll-free number for
consumers to call if they want their information excluded from the lists the agencies provide
to others. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(e)(5) (2000). This comes up most frequently with "pre-screening;"
that is, the practice of credit card issuers purchasing from credit bureaus lists of consumers
who meet certain criteria. The credit card issuer then invites the consumers on the list to
obtain the issuer's credit card.
188. 16 C.F.R. § 313.7(a)(2)(ii) (2005).
189. Id. § 313.7(a)(2)(iii)(A).
190. Id. § 306.10.
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sellers of insulation to inform consumers in a clear and conspicuous
way of a measure of the effectiveness of the insulation, known
as R-value,' 9 ' and to provide them with fact sheets explaining
R-values, 112  again facilitating the consumer decision-making
process. 9 ' Other administrative agencies have also acted to reduce
consumer transaction costs. The Federal Reserve Board, in promul-
gating regulations to implement the Truth in Lending Act' and the
Consumer Leasing Act, 95 has attempted to make it easier for
consumers to make borrowing decisions.
Transaction costs in many other arenas have also drawn the
attention of rulemakers. For a very different example from the ones
already mentioned, procedural reforms have reduced the cost of
asserting claims by, for example, providing for cheaper alternative
forums, such as small claims courts. 9 ' Similarly, class actions
spread the cost of asserting consumer claims over many claimants 97
191. Id. §§ 460.4-.5, 460.10, 460.12.
192. Id. §§ 460.13-.14.
193. The FTC explained when it adopted the R-value rule that
[m]arket imperfections that impede the process of providing such material
information in the regular flow of commerce discourage consumer consideration
of salient product features, diminish comparison shopping, and create
unwarranted competitive parity or advantage for inferior products. Thus, a
market that functions in this way not only harms consumers but also lessens
fair and open competition.
Statement of Basis and Purpose, 44 Fed. Reg. 50,218, 50,223 (Aug. 27, 1979).
194. The Truth in Lending Act was passed as Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667
(2000)); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.36 (2005).
195. Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240,90 Stat. 257 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1667-1667f (2000)); 12 C.F.R. §§ 213.1-.9 (2005).
196. See, e.g., Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 189 Misc. 2d 721, 727, 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 394 (Civ.
Ct. 2001) ("Small Claims Court has been established to provide a quick and low-cost forum
for the resolution of disputes.").
197. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,809 (1985) ("Class actions ... permit
the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually."). A more
recent Supreme Court case has expanded on this principle:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this
problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something
worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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while the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act'98 limits the venue of
collection actions brought by debt collectors to the district in which
the consumer resides or signed the contract in question.'99
B. Case Law
Some court decisions seemingly have adopted implicitly the
norm that companies should not excessively increase consumer
transaction costs, while other cases have not. These decisions
collectively suggest that courts are struggling with this subject.
That may be so because courts typically base their decisions on
interpretations of legislation or established common law principles,
and the ad hoc approach taken by legislatures to inflated consumer
transaction costs leaves the courts without a specifically stated
norm that firms may not unnecessarily increase consumer trans-
action costs.
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.200 illustrates courts' uncertain
treatment of this proposition. The court upheld the practice of
delivering the contract terms to the consumer inside the computer
box,2 ' the requirement that consumers unhappy with the contract
terms return the computer,2 °2 and the term mandating that any
arbitration take place in Chicago.2"3 On the other hand, because of
the cost of applying to the ICC, the court invalidated as unconscio-
nable the requirement that the rules of the ICC govern the
arbitration.2 '4 The court described that cost as "unreasonable" and
commented that it "surely serves to deter the individual consumer
from invoking the process."0 5 The court thus accepted the idea that
198. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2000)).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1692i (2000).
200. 246 A.D.2d 246, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. 1998). For a summary of the facts in Brower,
see supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
201. Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 250-51, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
202. Id. at 252-53, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
203. Id. at 253, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
204. Id.
205. Id. The court added that, "barred from resorting to the courts by the arbitration clause
in the first instance, the designation of a financially prohibitive forum effectively bars
consumers from this forum as well; consumers are thus left with no forum at all in which to
resolve a dispute." Id. Gateway had since amended its contract documents to permit
arbitration by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Id. Plaintiffs claimed that the
1691
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consumer transaction costs should not be excessive in some
circumstances, while rejecting it in others, though not in those
words.
To the extent that Brower upheld Gateway's practices, it relied
on Judge Easterbrook's controversial decision in Hill v. Gateway
2000, Inc.2"6 These Gateway cases and decisions like them2 7 that
AAA fees were also excessive, and thus the possibility of arbitration by AAA did not cure the
unconscionability of Gateway's contract. Id. The court found the record insufficiently
developed to rule on that claim. Id. at 253-56, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75. Accordingly, the court
remanded the case. Id. at 255-56, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 575. For other cases invalidating
arbitration agreements on unconscionability grounds because of the cost of arbitration in light
of the amount of the plaintiffs claim, see Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d
1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 1999); Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 (N.D. Cal.
2002); Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 934-35 (N.D. Cal. 2002), affd in part, 319 F.3d
1126 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811 (2003); Leonard v. Terminix Int'l Co., 854 So. 2d
529,535-38 (Ala. 2002); and Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d 594,605 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2002).
206. 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997).
207. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding as part
of the contract a licensing agreement placed inside a software program's packaging); Lozano
v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 & n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that customer
had received a brochure stating that service is subject to the terms and conditions in a
"Welcome Guide" and then holding that the "Welcome Guide" applied to the contract between
the buyer and seller, stating "that providing customers with terms and conditions after an
initial transaction is acceptable, and that such terms and conditions are enforceable, including
arbitration clauses"); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D.
Mass. 2002) (holding that a clickwrap license governs over a purchase order); Bischoff v.
DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1103-06 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding an arbitration term
enforceable although supplied to a customer after service was activated); Westendorf v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1110 (Del. Ch. 2000) (holding that
Gateway's terms and conditions inside a computer box bind a consumer if the consumer fails
to return the computer within thirty days); Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(CBC) 1143 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that a disclaimer of implied warranty of
merchantability placed inside a Zip drive's packaging was conspicuous and part of the
contract); 1-A Equip. Co. v. Icode, Inc., No. 1460, 2003 WL 549913 (Mass. App. Div. Feb. 21,
2003) (holding that a forum selection clause in an end user license and service agreement was
part of the contract); Levy v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1060 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1997) (upholding Gateway's arbitration clause); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline
Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 313 (Wash. 2000) (following the holding in ProCD). The
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), published by the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, also embraces these decisions. This acceptance can
be seen in the following provisions: Section 113(c) provides that "[if] a record or term is
available for review only after a person becomes obligated to pay or begins its performance,
the person has an opportunity to review only if it has a right to a return if it rejects the
record." UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 113(c), 7(11) U.L.A. 59 (Supp. 2005).
Section 112(a) states that
[a] person manifests assent to a record or term if the person, acting with
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uphold late disclosure of terms have been severely criticized20 8 and
some courts have rejected them.2"9 Much of the discussion of the
issues necessarily has focused on the U.C.C., and especially section
2-207, the well-known battle-of-the-forms provision. That section,
for all its virtues, seems not to be motivated by a desire to reduce
consumer transaction costs but by other unrelated concerns. 210 A
knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to review the record or term or a
copy of it ... intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with reason
to know that the other party or its electronic agent may infer from the conduct
or statement that the person assents to the record of term.
Id. § 112(a), 7(11) U.L.A. 55 (Supp. 2005). Section 208(2) is clearer:
The terms of a record may be adopted after beginning performance or use if the
parties had reason to know that their agreement would be represented in whole
or part by a later record to be agreed on and there would not be an opportunity
to review the record or a copy of it before performance or use begins.
Id. § 208(2), 7(11) U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 2005). Comment three to section 208 explains:
Subsection (b) reflects the reality of layered contracting. While some contracts
are formed and their terms defined at a single point in time, many transactions
involve a rolling or layered process. The commercial expectation is that terms
will follow or be developed after performance begins. This Act rejects cases that
narrowly treat contracting as a single event despite ordinary practice. It adopts
a rule in cases that recognize that contracts are often formed over time.
Id. § 208 cmt. 3, 7(11) U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 2005) (citing ProCD and Mortensen); see also UNIF.
COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 209 cmt. 5, 7(11) U.L.A. 82 (Supp. 2005). See generally
Bern, supra note 63, at 772-79 (describing the history of UCITA and examining some of its
provisions). Though the 2003 amendments to Article 2 of the U.C.C. purport to take no
position on whether courts should adopt the reasoning of these cases, see U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt.
5 (amended 2003), 1 U.L.A. 397-99 (2004), at least one observer believes that the amendments
undermine the statutory support for contrary decisions and appear to legitimize the ProCD
line of cases, see Bern, supra note 63, at 783-94.
208. See, e.g., Bern, supra note 63, at 779-83; Braucher, supra note 41, at 1806-09; Thomas
J. McCarthy, Patricia A. Tauchert, John D. Wladis, & Mark E. Roszkowski, Sales, 53 Bus.
LAW. 1461,1465-66 (1998); Sternlight, supra note 39; Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-
Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO
L. REV. 319, 344-52 (1999). But see Barnett, supra note 125, at 627; Darren C. Baker, Note,
ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Commercial Reality, Flexibility in Contract Formation, and Notions of
Manifested Assent in the Arena of Shrinkwrap Licenses, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 379, 379-82 (1997)
(arguing that the ProCD court reached the correct result).
209. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 97-106 (3d Cir. 1991); Klocek
v. Gateway, Inc. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1337-41 (D. Kan. 2000); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris,
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1205-06 (D. Kan. 1998); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc.
831 F. Supp. 759, 766 (D. Ariz. 1993); Licitra v. Gateway, 189 Misc. 2d 721, 723-730, 734
N.Y.S.2d 389, 391-96 (Civ. Ct. 2001).
210. This unrelated motivation is suggested by the first official comment to the section,
which describes two "typical situations" the section is intended to address. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt.
1, 1 U.L.A. 208-09 (2004). In the first situation, both parties are said to send each other formal
memoranda. Id. Consumers do not normally use formal memoranda in making purchases. The
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norm that firms should not inflate consumer transaction costs would
have led to a different outcome in the Gateway cases, or at least to
a different rationale by the courts.21' The courts would instead have
focused more on how and whether delayed disclosure increases
consumer transaction costs and impairs the functioning of the
market.212
Forum selection clauses present a scenario in which courts
have chosen regulation rather than an absolute ban on or outright
approval of inflated transaction costs. For example, in Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,213 the Supreme Court reversed a court of
appeals decision that refused to enforce a forum selection clause in
a cruise line ticket.21 '4 The Court explained that such clauses are
subject to scrutiny for fundamental fairness and evaluated the
clause for reasonableness, finding that it passed those tests.21 5
The plaintiffs, who appear to have been residents of Washington
state, boarded in California for a cruise to Mexico and then back to
California; the forum selection clause provided that disputes
would be resolved in Florida, where the cruise line was based.21 6
Whatever fundamental fairness and reasonableness mean, they
apparently do not bar enforcement of a forum selection clause in
comment gives an example of the second typical situation, in which the parties are said to
send a printed purchase order and acceptance or acknowledgment form; the paragraph also
refers to the buyer's form. Id. Consumers do not customarily use their own forms when buying
goods. Section 2-207 thus seems designed to govern business-to-business transactions, rather
than consumer transactions.
211. Cf. Braucher, supra note 41, at 1810 (noting that delayed disclosure of contract terms
increases transaction costs).
212. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
213. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). The decision was criticized forcefully by Professors Mullenix and
Purcell. See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise
Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323 (1992); Purcell, supra note
46, at 486-87.
214. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 597.
215. Id. at 590-95. Carnival Cruise Lines in fact has much in common with the contracts
in Brower. Not only do the contracts at issue in both cases include forum selection clauses (the
Brower contract provided for arbitration rather than a judicial forum), but the clause at issue
in Carnival Cruise Lines appears not to have been available until after the consumer
purchased the ticket, according to Justice Stevens's dissent. Id. at 597 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens also reported that if a consumer, having read the ticket, decided
to back out of the cruise, the contract excused the cruise line from refunding the consumer's
money. Id.
216. Id. at 587-88.
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such circumstances.217 In many cases, of course, a requirement that
consumer plaintiffs must incur the transaction cost of traveling
across the country to assert their claims will itself be enough to
dispose of the case.218 Greater concern for the costs imposed by the
forum selection clause might have produced a different approach.219
Such a different approach is evident in Spiegel, Inc. v. Federal
Trade Commission.22 Spiegel sold goods to consumers throughout
the country via its catalog.221 When consumers defaulted on their
obligations, Spiegel sued them in Chicago, where it was based.2 22
When consumers objected to the forum, either by traveling to
Chicago to complain or by retaining local counsel, Spiegel volun-
tarily dismissed the action, but that did not help consumers who
could not afford to travel or hire Chicago attorneys.223 The FTC,
observing that the cost of travel alone might exceed the amount in
controversy, found that Spiegel had engaged in unfair practices in
violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.224 The Seventh
Circuit enforced the Commission's order.225
217. One commentator has suggested that after Carnival Cruise Lines, if a business
designates its home state as the forum, the consumer will not be able to defeat the forum
selection clause. Goldman, supra note 47, at 711.
218. Id. at 712 ("[The expenses of transporting witnesses, hiring local counsel, and
attending trial may make pursuit of legitimate consumer claims impractical or undesirable.").
219. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595. The Court did note:
[There is no indication that (the cruise line] set Florida as the forum in which
disputes were to be resolved as a means of discouraging cruise passengers from
pursuing legitimate claims. Any suggestion of such a bad-faith motive is belied
by two facts: [the cruise line] has its principal place of business in Florida, and
many of its cruises depart from and return to Florida ports. Similarly, there is
no evidence that [the cruise line] obtained [the consumers] accession to the
forum clause by fraud or overreaching.
Id. By putting the burden on the consumer to demonstrate such a bad-faith motive, at least
in cases in which the firm has its headquarters in the chosen state, the Court places a heavy
burden on consumers. Consumers will have an especially difficult time carrying this burden,
given the small stakes at issue in the typical consumer case, which will often make efforts to
conduct discovery on such an issue uneconomic.
220. 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976).
221. Id. at 290.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 290-91.
224. Id. at 291; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
225. Spiegel, 540 F.2d at 296-97 (enforcing Commission's order with modifications not
relevant to this Article). For similar results, see Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165,
1176-77 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Sun Trust Bank v. Sun Int'l Hotels Ltd., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1246,
1261-62 (S.D. Fl. 2001); In re J.C. Penney Co., 109 F.T.C. 54, 55-57 (1987) (reprinting consent
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Carnival Cruise Lines and Spiegel are distinguishable in many
ways. One case involves a forum-selection clause; the other does
not.226 In one, the plaintiff chose the forum; in the other, the
defendant did. An administrative agency entitled to considerable
deference had already ruled in and was defending its decision in
Spiegel while private plaintiffs brought suit in Carnival Cruise
Lines. Nevertheless, the different results owe at least as much to a
different approach to forum selection clauses as they do to any of
these facts. The Supreme Court was less concerned with inflating
consumer transaction costs than was the FTC. If the Supreme Court
had been able to employ the law of unfairness, as it would if
reviewing an FTC unfairness decision, for example, it might have
decided differently.
This distinction points out the central difference between courts
and administrative agencies in this area. Administrative agencies
may find it easier than courts to reduce consumer transaction costs
at present because they may have recourse to a norm that permits
them to take consumer transaction costs into account. Thus, the
FTC's power to outlaw unfair practices allows the FTC to act in a
way that courts generally cannot.
This is not to say that no relevant rules exist for courts to
employ, just that the rules are not aimed directly at the problem of
decree in which a company agreed not to bring collections cases against consumers in distant
forums); In re Marathon Oil Co., 92 F.T.C. 422, 424 (1978) (same); In re S.S. Kresge Co., 90
F.T.C. 222, 224 (1977) (same); In re Montgomery Ward & Co. 84 F.T.C. 1337, 1339-40 (1974)
(same); In re West Coast Credit Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1328, 1330-31 (1974) (same); Schubach v.
Household Fin. Corp., 376 N.E.2d 140, 140-42 (Mass. 1978); Williams v. Am. Online, Inc., 43
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 1101, 1105-06 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2001); Celebrezze v. United
Research, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a bookseller's
practice of suing in a forum distant from consumers' home was unfair and unconscionable);
Santiago v. S.S. Kresge Co., 2 Ohio Op. 2d 54 (Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga Cnty.
1976) (holding that the practice of suing in a forum distant from consumers' home was
unconscionable and violated Ohio UDAP statute); Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 56 Misc. 2d
463,464-65,288 N.Y.S.2d 817,818-19 (Sup. Ct. 1968), affd, 30 A.D.2d 1052,295 N.Y.S.2d 606
(App. Div. 1968). On the other hand, many courts uphold forum selection clauses against
challenge. See, e.g., Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 529 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999) (enforcing an online forum selection clause in a class action suit).
226. Forum selection clauses are not necessarily dispositive. See Thompson v. Handa-
Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 739, 741, 746 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that an "inconspicuous"
clause that a reasonable person would not have noticed and that was "buried" within the
contract on the defendant's website and that provided for binding arbitration in California did
not deprive Texas courts of jurisdiction over the dispute).
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inflated consumer transaction costs. The UCC's prohibition on
unconscionable contracts and terms offers some aid; indeed, it was
used in Brower to invalidate the term requiring application of the
rules of the ICC.227 Similarly, some states have enacted "little FTC"
acts that prohibit unfair practices.228
Another rule that courts have used to stop companies from
unnecessarily inflating transaction costs is the general require-
ment that contracting parties act in good faith, as exemplified
in U.C.C. section 1-203.229 For example, in Badie v. Bank of
227. See supra Part I.A.2. The Code's prohibition on unconscionable contracts and terms
appears in U.C.C. § 2-302, 1A U.L.A. 344 (2004). For other examples of the use of the
unconscionability doctrine against agreements that inflated transaction costs, though not
necessarily in those terms, see Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 929-30 (N.D. Cal. 2002),
affd in part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 811 (2003) (finding that when
AT&T conceded that its (adhesion) contract would be read in its entirety by thirty percent of
customers and that ten percent would not read it at all, and that the company did not take
steps to increase the likelihood that customers would read the agreement, the agreement was
procedurally unconscionable); John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1571,
1574 (D. Kan. 1986) (holding a contract term unconscionable because the term was in difficult-
to-read fine print on the back of a form and the wording was "unreasonably complex ... as if
the scrivener intended to conceal the thrust of the agreement in the convoluted language and
fine print"); Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Ariz. 1992)
(holding that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the consumer was not told
that she was giving up her right to a jury trial and the agreement did not explain that to her,
and stating that " [c]ontracts of adhesion will not be enforced unless they are conscionable and
within the reasonable expectations of the parties"); Villa Milano Homeowners Assoc. v. IL
Davorge, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 7-8 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding unconscionable an arbitration clause
found on pages 67-68 of a 70-page agreement that was probably accompanied by "thick stack"
of other documents); East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 715-17 (Miss. 2002) (finding
unconscionable an arbitration clause printed in type a fraction of the typesize of other terms);
cf McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc. 410 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn. 1987)
(declaring a contract term in tiny print unenforceable because it was unreadable, but
declining to reach unconscionability issue).
228. For examples of courts using such statutes to prohibit practices that inflate consumer
transaction costs, see supra note 225. For a description of every state's "little FTC" act, which
indicates which states bar unfair practices, see JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER,
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES 759-75 (4th ed. 1997).
229. U.C.C. § 1-203, 1 U.L.A. 244 (2004) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes
an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."). See generally Seth William
Goren, Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places: Problems in Applying the Implied Covenant
of Good Faith Performance, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 257, 263-68 (2003) (noting the mainstream
acceptance of good faith). Another possible norm that courts may find useful is RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981), which provides that "[wihere the [merchant] has
reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the
writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement." See generally
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 80, at 458-59; Meyerson, supra note 45, at 1287-89;
Slawson, supra note 80, at 60-63. In some cases, contracting parties have also found aid in the
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America,"' Bank of America had used a bill-stuffer to modify its
agreements with its depositors and credit card customers to provide
for resolution of disputes by alternative dispute resolution (ADR). '
Bank of America took the position that it had a right to do so
because its agreements contained provisions allowing for changes
in terms."2 Notwithstanding California's public policy in favor of
ADR, the court held the attempted amendment ineffective.2"' In the
Badie court's view, it was objectively unreasonable-and hence a
breach of the duty to act in good faith and deal fairly-for a party to
add "an entirely new term which has no bearing on any subject,
issue, right, or obligation addressed in the original contract and
which was not within the reasonable contemplation of the parties
when the contract was entered into."3
In sum, though legislatures and administrative agencies have
often acted to reduce consumer transaction costs, courts have been
less free to do so, probably because they often lack a norm they can
use to justify such action. One option would be to create a rule
motivated by such a norm, similar to the rules in the U.C.C. barring
unconscionable terms and requiring contracting parties to act in
good faith. Another option is to leave the creation of rules barring
the increasing of consumer transaction costs to legislatures and
administrative agencies, but to urge them to be more mindful of the
problem of inflated transaction costs. Ajudgment as to which course
reasonable expectations test; that rule, transplanted from insurance law, limits enforcement
of contract terms to those a consumer might reasonably have expected to appear in a contract.
See Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 5-9 (Mont. 2002) (finding that an arbitration
clause that waived trial by jury was not within party's reasonable expectations and therefore
was not enforceable); see also Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Barerra, 21 P.3d 395, 399-404
(Ariz. 2000) (holding inconspicuous insurance terms that were incomprehensible to an
ordinary consumer in rental car contract inapplicable when effect of terms would be
inconsistent with consumer's reasonable expectations). See generally Burke, supra note 87,
at 300-03 (discussing reasonable expectation test); Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of
the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1461 (1989).
230. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998).
231. Id. at 276-77.
232. Id. at 277-78.
233. Id. at 291.
234. Id. at 284. The court added that "[that is particularly true where the new term
deprives the other party of the right to a jury trial and the right to select a judicial forum for
dispute resolution." Id. The court also found, as a matter of contract interpretation, that the
customers, by agreeing to the change in terms, did not intend to give the bank the power to
deprive them of the use of the court system and of a jury trial. Id. at 290-91.
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is best requires some consideration of what such a norm might look
like, and so this Article now turns to that issue, among others.
V. ADOPTING A NORM CONCERNING INFLATED TRANSACTION COSTS
Legislatures and courts have not expressly adopted a general rule
that firms may not inflate consumer transaction costs, though as
described in the preceding Part, in many instances in which firms
have increased consumer transaction costs to their own advantage,
lawmakers have intervened on an ad hoc basis. This Part offers
some guidance in implementing such a norm.
A norm prohibiting the unnecessary inflation of consumer
transaction costs would supplement, rather than supplant, bans on
particular practices that increase transaction costs. That is to say,
the goal of a general norm would be to assist lawmakers and law
enforcers in attacking practices that have not yet generated the
legislative attention and energy necessary to enact legislation
targeted at the offensive practice. Rebates again serve as a useful
example. Some action concerning rebates seems desirable to avoid
the bait-and-switch type of deception they seem to generate.
Assuming that rulemakers wish to regulate rebates, they would
most likely choose one of two approaches: either they would ban
rebates altogether, or as a less sweeping first step, rulemakers could
regulate them, by, for example, requiring simplified rebate proce-
dures."5
A legislature could simply enact either of these two approaches.
A regulatory agency could promulgate rules adopting them also,
provided it acted consistently with its authorizing legislation.
Courts, however, would probably be reluctant to require particular
rebate procedures, though they could ban rebates provided they
found a norm or statute which could be read to authorize such an
action. A ban on unnecessary inflation of consumer transaction costs
would facilitate such regulation, but it would not make it unneces-
sary.
Any regulation designed to implement a norm barring excessive
increases in consumer transaction costs would necessarily be
235. One proposal to regulate rebates was recently vetoed by the governor of California.
See S.B. 1154, 2003-2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004) (vetoed Sept. 29, 2004).
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paternalistic.236 Regulations dealing with different increases in
transaction costs might take different forms, such as a disclosure
requirement or an outright prohibition on certain practices, but
certainly they would interfere to some extent with the power to
contract. That interference seems justified, however, as an
example of what has been called asymmetric paternalism: that is,
paternalism that benefits those who are not capable of protecting
themselves-perhaps because of bounded rationality-while
imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational and
capable of protecting themselves.237 When market failures inter-
fere with reaching an efficient outcome, the only alternative to
intervention is acceptance of the inefficient outcome, which seems
undesirable.
Many practices that inflate consumer transaction costs have
legitimate justifications.23 Some may even benefit consumers by
reducing business expenses, thus enabling firms to offer their
products at lower prices, at least in competitive markets. For
example, imagine the use of a forum selection clause in connection
with an incident that generates a great deal of litigation, such as a
mass tort. In such circumstances, a firm would benefit from having
all the cases filed in the same forum. The reduced litigation costs
might ultimately benefit consumers as well. The fact that forum
selection clauses are undesirable in much consumer litigation, such
as isolated incidents like that in Carnival Cruise Lines, does not
mean that they are undesirable in all.
236. Camerer et al., supra note 57, at 1211 ("Paternalism treads on consumer sovereignty
by forcing, or preventing, choices for the individual's own good, much as when parents limit
their child's freedom to skip school ....").
237. See id. at 1212.
238. Just because a practice that increases consumer transaction costs can be justified does
not mean that firms should be able to engage in it. For example, lenders could justify quoting
interest rates in many different ways before enactment of the Truth in Lending Act, see supra
text accompanying note 97 but those justifications were not enough to impose transaction
costs on consumers, and so Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act to provide for a
uniform method of calculating interest rates. Similarly, inserting contracts with their
products rather than furnishing them to consumers in advance, and using uninteresting bill-
stuffers rather than designing inserts that are more likely to draw consumer attention are
both probably less expensive for firms, but obscuring disclosures in such a way remains
problematic.
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Similarly, form contracts serve a number of important
purposes,239 ironically including the reduction of transaction costs.
240
To be sure, fine print is troublesome, but even other means of
communicating contract terms, such as agreements written in
legible type and simple English, may inflate consumer transaction
costs, and would probably not be read by most consumers. A norm
that outlaws standard term contracts arguably goes too far.24'
Consequently, a norm that outlaws all business practices that
increase consumer transaction costs would be excessive.
Some mechanism is needed to distinguish between practices
that inflate consumer transaction costs unnecessarily and those that
are acceptable. Ideally, the result would enable consumers to
purchase the goods and services in question with terms and at
prices that maximize consumer utility. Accordingly, this Article now
turns to mechanisms for distinguishing between practices that
unacceptably increase consumer transaction costs and those that
are less objectionable.
A. Tests of When To Outlaw Practices That Inflate Transaction
Costs
As a threshold matter, lawmakers should ask, in Russell
Korobkin's words, whether the practice involves a term that "is
salient to a significant number of buyers."242 If it is, the functioning
of the market should see that the term is efficient as long as firms
239. Ratkoff, supra note 47, at 1222-23.
Form documents promote efficiency within a complex organizational structure....
Standard forms facilitate the diffusion to underlings of management's decisions
regarding the risks the organization is prepared to bear .... [florm contracts
serve[] as an automatic check on the consequences of the acts of wayward sales
personnel. The pressure to produce may tempt salesmen to make bargains into
which the organization is unwilling to enter; the use of standard form contracts
to state the terms of the deal obviates much of the need for, and expense of,
internal control and discipline in this regard.
Id.; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 701 (1939) (reviewing D.
PRAUSmITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL
LAW (1937)).
240. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 93, at 638.
241. For a discussion of the benefits of standard form contracts, see Hillman & Rachlinski,
supra note 80, at 437-39. But see Meyerson, supra note 45, at 1299 ("As a general rule,
consumers should only be bound by those contract terms that they know and comprehend.").
242. Korobkin, supra note 90, at 1207.
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cannot distinguish between searchers for the term and those who do
not bother, and no intervention will be necessary. If, however, it is
not salient, several other inquiries can be used to determine if a
practice should be outlawed.
The first of these tests asks whether the practice is valuable to
firms solely or principally because it inflates consumer transaction
costs. If the answer is yes, then the practice should be presumed
to violate the norm. However, one apparent problem with such a
test is that firms can nearly always offer some justification for
increasing consumer transaction costs. For example, merchants
might attempt to rationalize the use of rebates by arguing that
they generate mailing lists of consumers who have purchased a
particular product,24 3 and that such mailing lists are valuable.'
Nevertheless, courts and administrative agencies are experienced
at distinguishing between legitimate justifications and pretexts, and
so should usually be able to penetrate to the truth.
The next test would ask what would happen if consumers had
perfect information and could bargain competitively.245 If, for
example, consumers understood that they were not likely to obtain
rebates, they would not take rebate offers into account in deciding
whether to buy products. Rulemakers might respond to that either
by outlawing any practice that both inflated consumer transaction
243. P.J. Huffstutter, O.C. Tech Beat; Freeafterrebate.com Offers What Name Says for the
Record, L.A. TIMES (Orange County Edition), July 12, 1999, at C1 ("Rebates also can ... be
used to gather information about customers."); Ellen James Martin, 100 Years of Cutting
Along the Dotted Line; Cents-able: Since the First 5-Cents-Off a Glass of Coke Offer, Coupons
Have Saved Americans $4.8 Billion a Year, BALT. SUN, Dec. 27, 1995, at 1E ("Companies that
use refund coupons are now developing a huge data base of information on consumer
preferences, says Tom Wright, president and chief executive of [coupon design firm] First
Fulfillment."); Silverstein, supra note 6, at C4 ("[M]anufacturers rely on rebates to collect
information on consumers.").
244. Sovern, supra note 28, at 1108-09 (discussing the value of mailing lists). For some of
the otherjustifications for offering rebates, see Marvin A. Jolson, Joshua L. Wiener & Richard
B. Rosecky, Correlates of Rebate Proneness, J. ADVERTISING RES., Feb.-Mar. 1987, at 33, 34.
245. Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost.- A
View from the Left, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 919, 927-28 (arguing that Coase's article "might be
stretched ... to suggest ... [wihere the various options in designing legal rules will necessarily
result in significant transaction costs, legal rules should be structured so as to ... [as one
alternative] approximate the sort of welfare enhancing agreements that would be reached in
the absence of transaction costs"); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE
62 (1981) ("[IUn many cases a court can make a reasonably accurate guess as to the allocation
of resources that would maximize wealth.").
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costs and would not be agreed to by perfectly informed consumers,
or by taking steps to inform consumers so that they would have the
necessary information to make an appropriate decision-though
again, internalities can bedevil even informed consumers. For
example, policymakers might require rebate offers to disclose that
few consumers redeem similar rebates.
This test has significant limits. Ascertaining what competitive
markets would do in the absence of such a market is difficult. If
consumers and firms were to bargain competitively, it could be
expected that compromises and tradeoffs would occur, but determin-
ing in the absence of such a market what those tradeoffs might be
is impossible. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that consumers
possessing perfect information and bargaining in competitive
markets would ever agree to many of the practices that firms
impose on consumers to inflate transaction costs. Knowledgeable
consumers would be unlikely to approve of obscured contract terms,
fees for arbitration that exceed the value of the good giving rise to
the arbitration, forum selection clauses that require all litigation to
take place in a distant forum, or a requirement that consumers
must create and mail their own forms when the firm to which they
are writing maintains a staff to receive other information by
telephone, especially when the firm could make a single form to be
used by all consumers rather than leaving a multitude of consumers
to draft their own forms.' Accordingly, though this test will not
yield a clear answer in some cases, in many situations it will.
A similar test would ask how consumers would behave in the
absence of inflated transaction costs and then would attempt to
replicate that result. 7 For example, policymakers could ask
whether consumers would permit the sale of information about their
246. From an efficiency standpoint, putting the burden of creating a privacy form on firms
rather than on consumers makes more sense. A firm that has the burden of inventing such
a form can do so only once and, by sending it to customers, obviates the need for customers
to draft their own form. If the firm does not do so, customers who desire privacy will have to
invent their own form, thereby investing much more time in the aggregate than would the
firm. When the Federal Trade Commission drafted regulations to implement the privacy
provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, it required the firms to supply consumers with the
form. 16 C.F.R. § 313.7 (2005).
247. Cf. Schlag, supra note 30, at 1661-63 (characterizing the Chicago school of law and
economics' market-based approach as arguing that "[wihere transaction costs are high, [a
party should] structure the legal regime to approximate the outcomes that the parties would
have reached in a zero transaction cost world").
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purchases if they did not incur costs in preventing that sale. Though
this approach is useful in some contexts, it again suffers from the
defect that it is sometimes difficult to predict how consumers would
behave in the absence of transaction costs. In circumstances in
which different consumers would behave differently-which appears
to be true of privacy, according to polls showing that consumers'
preferences appear to vary 4 8 -it provides an uncertain guide.
A related test would focus on whether the loss to consumers
would exceed the benefits to the company when the company
increases consumer transaction costs. Parties in competitive
markets should not agree to terms that generate a net reduction in
the benefits from the transaction. For example, imagine a transac-
tion between a buyer and a seller in a competitive market. Now
assume that the seller offers the buyer a term that inflates the
buyer's transaction costs in some respect. A buyer with perfect
information in a competitive market should agree to such a term
only if the seller compensates the buyer for the loss to the buyer's
welfare; if the seller fails to do so, but still insists on the term, a
rational buyer would buy from the seller's competitor who did not
increase the buyer's transaction costs. The seller will be willing to
pay the buyer enough to compensate the buyer for the losses in
welfare the buyer suffers from the increased transaction costs only
if the value of the term to the seller is equal to or greater than the
loss the buyer suffers from the term; otherwise, the seller would
suffer a loss from the transaction.
Accordingly, in a competitive market with all parties having
perfect information, the parties would not agree to increase a
party's transaction costs unless the other party's benefits from
the transaction are at least as valuable to that party as the loss in
welfare suffered by the party whose costs are increased. As a result,
one test of whether terms that increase consumer transaction costs
pass muster is whether the benefit to the company is at least equal
to the loss to consumers.
Once again, rebates offer a useful example. The benefit to the
company from using a rebate instead of a sale is its savings in
providing money to consumers. Consumers who do not obtain a
rebate suffer a loss in money equal to the gain to the company. But
248. See Sovern, supra note 28, at 1056-64.
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that is not the only loss consumers experience from rebates. As
noted above, consumers who purchase an item in the mistaken
belief that they will obtain the rebate have suffered a distortion of
their demand function; they have purchased an item they would not
otherwise have bought.249 Consumers who submit the required form
lose the time needed to complete the form; as discussed above, some
of that loss is a dead weight loss to society.25 The result is that the
benefit to the company is less than the loss to consumers.
Policymakers should approach the problem of inflated consumer
transaction costs, then, by first asking whether the firm has
increased the consumer's transaction costs. If the firm has,
policymakers should next ask whether the practice involves a term
that is salient to a significant number of consumers. If it is not,
policymakers should then explore whether the practice runs afoul
of any of the other criteria discussed above: whether the practice
affords any significant benefit other than to increase consumer
transaction costs, whether the practice is one that consumers would
agree to in a competitive market, how consumers would behave in
a world of zero transaction costs, and whether the loss to consumers
outweighs the benefit to the firm. Not all of these factors will have
a clear answer with respect to a particular practice; perhaps none
will. They offer a guide, however, for deciding which practices
should be outlawed, or at least regulated.
B. Implementing the Norm
Society can employ a variety of ways to adopt such a norm.
Legislatures can enact statutes. The FTC can promulgate trade
regulation rules,25' probably using its power to ban unfair practices,
or it could proceed on a case-by-case basis, as in Spiegel.252 Other
249. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
250. Id.
251. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(A) (2000).
252. As for the role of the FTC in connection with inflated transaction costs due to market
failures:
Even though the legislative history of the FTC Act does not explicitly refer to the
market failure concept, with the advantage of hindsight one might well conclude
that Congress had something like it in mind. The FTC may have been
established because of a congressional belief that such factors as false
information, imperfect or incomplete information, transaction cost problems, or
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administrative agencies also can act concerning matters within
their jurisdiction.
Courts present a more difficult problem for three reasons. First,
as noted above, courts are circumscribed by the usually expressed
need to employ an existing statute or common law rule. Three such
existing rules include "little FTC" acts in states that include
unfairness language in their statutes, the power to invalidate
unconscionable terms and contracts, and the duty contracting
parties have to act in good faith. Those powers will go only so far,
but in many instances they will be helpful. At a minimum, courts
resolving disputes under these rules can use the tests described
above to determine whether a particular practice should be struck
down. Though these tests are vague, they surely are no more so
than the tests for, say, unconscionability, with its requirement of
substantive and sometimes procedural unconscionability. Indeed,
one test of substantive unconscionability could be whether a term
unduly inflates consumer transaction costs. In any event, legisla-
tures could respond to the limits of these existing norms by creating
a new norm for courts to enforce that would outlaw the undesirable
inflation of consumer transaction costs.
Second, courts tend to be more limited than legislatures and
administrative agencies in fashioning remedies.253 Thus, while
legislatures and administrative agencies occasionally resort to
disclosure requirements," courts rarely do. Courts seldom can do
more than either permit a term to stand or strike it,255 although
conceivably, legislatures could empower courts to use other
remedies, including reformation of contracts.
Third, courts are ill suited to make the determinations described
above. For example, courts do not seem ideally organized to decide
insufficient resources explain the failure of the free market to adequately protect
consumer welfare.
Averitt & Lande, supra note 106, at 728 (footnotes omitted).
253. Cf. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 97, at 678 ("[Clourts cannot issue the remedies
necessary to initiate movement of markets toward competitive equilibria.").
254. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000) (citing disclosures in credit
transactions as a major purpose for passing the Truth in Lending Act); 16 C.F.R. § 444.3
(2005) (requiring notice to cosigner of obligations assumed by the cosigner).
255. Cf. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 97, at 678-82 (concluding that courts should exercise
only limited powers in responding to information problems and that those powers should be
exercised cautiously).
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if a practice is one that consumers would agree to in a competitive
market, how consumers would behave in a world of zero transaction
costs, or if a loss to consumers outweighs the benefits to the firm.2"
On the other hand, courts have been up to the task of making
difficult determinations many times before.
Confining the use of the norm to legislatures and administrative
agencies runs some risk, too. Regulatory provisions directed at
consumer problems are often targeted at specific problems. For
example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley provisions address privacy in
financial transactions but do not reach other privacy issues. Thus,
while a bank may be restrained from reporting that a consumer
used her credit card to purchase a book, the bookstore is free to
disclose the same purchase. When legislatures enact more general
rules, like the prohibition on unconscionable terms in the U.C.C.,
courts are able to use the norms thus established to address a
broader array of problems, including problems that the legislature
did not anticipate. For this reason alone, it is desirable to give
courts the power to employ a norm against unreasonable increases
in transaction costs so that, to the extent the ingenuity of merchants
outraces that of legislatures, courts can redress the balance.
In addition, legislatures and agencies tend to produce rules only
when a problem is widespread and ongoing. The energy needed to
pass a statute or even promulgate a rule is too great to squander on
rarely repeated problems. But courts are obliged to act if only one
suitor commences an action. Thus, courts may find a practice
unconscionable when a legislature or administrative agency would
not summon the resources needed to respond to the practice.
Accordingly, courts should be able to employ the norm, rather than
limit its use to legislatures and administrative agencies.257
256. Cf Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 80, at 441 ("Courts have difficulty distinguishing
between terms that create a reasonable arrangement of risks and terms that constitute
exploitation of consumers. They lack the incentives and experiences that allow businesses to
identify and distinguish between sensible practices and opportunities to exploit consumers.")
(footnote omitted); Korobkin, supra note 90, at 1253 ("[R]equiring courts to determine de novo
whether particular terms are efficient or inefficient would strain the bounds of judicial
competence .... ").
257. Cf Korobkin, supra note 90, at 1206 ("Courts can increase utility for buyers and
sellers, as well as promote social efficiency, by enforcing efficient terms in form contracts and
refusing to enforce inefficient terms.").
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Moreover, when courts invalidate a term, they furnish a variety
of actors with an incentive to act. Firms that desire to have the
benefits of the term must modify their practices by finding a way to
add the term to new contracts without violating existing norms.
Legislatures and administrative agencies may respond by creating
disclosure rules that permit the term to be inserted in contracts
provided that certain disclosures are made. The alternative of
depriving the courts of the power to strike terms that unreasonably
inflate consumer transaction costs seems less desirable than a
regime in which courts may occasionally strike terms that would
pass muster in a different form.
Ideally, legislatures will enact new statutes to make explicit that
courts have the power to invalidate terms that unjustifiably
increase consumer transaction costs. Such statutes could be written,
like the unconscionability provision in the U.C.C., in general terms
to give courts discretion to act when action is needed and to refrain
from action when restraint is desirable. The statutes could provide
that when a practice increases consumer transaction costs the
merchant bears the burden of proving that the increase is justified.
In determining whether the increase is warranted, courts could use
the tests described above.
In sum, it seems best for legislatures and administrative agencies
to use the norm as a guide in fashioning rules, and to permit courts
to use it as well, preferably through enactment of new statutes but,
failing that, through existing rules, such as the prohibitions on
unconscionable contracts and terms, parties to contracts acting in
bad faith, and unfair trade practices.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that firms inflate consumer
transaction costs to generate greater profits. Firms do so, by, for
example, obscuring contract terms in a variety of ways, such as
providing them after the contract is agreed to; enclosing them with
other, more interesting information; using small print; and omitting
important terms from the written contract, such as arbitration fees.
Firms also take advantage of predictable consumer behaviors, such
as the tendency of consumers not to seek rebates, to overload when
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provided with too much information, and to ignore dull information
when overshadowed by vivid information.
When transaction costs are inflated unnecessarily, the total
surplus from exchange is diminished even though one party's gains
from the exchange may be enhanced. Legislatures and administra-
tive agencies have often acted to restrain firms from increasing
consumer transaction costs unnecessarily. Courts, however, lacking
a clear norm to use to outlaw practices that increase transaction
costs, have responded inconsistently to inflated transaction costs.
Though courts have sometimes employed general rules, such as
the prohibition on unconscionable terms and contracts, to bar
increases in transaction costs, on other occasions they have declined
opportunities to do so.
Lawmakers should embrace a norm prohibiting unnecessarily
inflated transaction costs. When a firm has increased the con-
sumer's transaction costs, policymakers should ask whether the
practice involves a term that is salient to a significant number of
consumers. If it is not, policymakers should then ask four questions:
(1) Does the practice afford any significant benefit other than to
increase consumer transaction costs? (2) Is the practice one that
consumers would agree to in a competitive market? (3) How would
consumers behave in a world of zero transaction costs? (4) Does the
loss to consumers outweigh the benefit to the firm? The answers to
these questions should determine whether the practice should be
outlawed. Legislatures and administrative agencies should employ
the norm in fashioning rules and courts should use the norm as a
guide in implementing existing rules, including the prohibition on
unconscionable terms and contracts.
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